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1. Introduction 
 In centralized federations with administrative powers of the sub-federal jurisdictions (ad-
ministrative federalism), in which the federal government sets tax rates, tax bases and the rules of 
tax collection, tax auditing often remains the only instrument available for regions to conduct 
own tax policies. Indeed, there is some (so far mostly anecdotal) evidence for several federations 
that regions differ in their thoroughness in enforcing tax laws. In Germany, rich and poor states 
(Länder) are supposedly less strict in their tax auditing activity to compete for mobile taxpayers 
(Baretti, Huber and Lichtblau, 2002; Stöwhase and Traxler, 2005). In Belgium, the Flemish re-
gion has been repeatedly accused of being relatively lax in its tax auditing (Cremer and Gahvari, 
2000). Occasionally regional governments even provide different support to local businesses to 
avoid federal taxation and legislation (Cai and Treisman, 2004). And, naturally, this issue be-
comes more important in developing and transition economies, since a deficit of the rule of law 
provides for additional opportunities for regional governments and enterprises to collude. 
There are several reasons for regional governments to reduce their efforts in tax auditing 
and collection. In a framework of inter-jurisdictional fiscal competition enforcement policy will 
act as an instrument to attract mobile capital, if direct changes of tax rates are impossible. Re-
gions compete by “sheltering” firms from federal taxation or other interventions (Cremer and 
Gahvari, 2000; Cai and Treisman, 2004; Sonin, 2005). This activity becomes especially impor-
tant, if the degree of state capture (i.e. privileged relations between individual businesses and 
public officials of the respective government level able to determine economic policy making) at 
the regional level is higher than at the central level, and influential firms seek protection of the 
regional authorities against the (uncontrolled) centre (Treisman, 1999). The results of fiscal com-
petition through tax auditing depend on the scheme of fiscal equalization implemented in the fed-
eration (Stöwhase and Traxler, 2005). From the perspective of vertical fiscal relations, a bad 
standing in tax collection could be attractive for regional governments, if benefits from federal 
grants exceed potential losses from lower tax collection or fiscal transfers depend on deficits of 
regional budgets. Finally, the federal (central) government could also be interested in reducing its 
tax collection effort. In this case different tax auditing policies in different regions act as an in-
strument of spatial redistribution or business subsidizing, if direct grants or transfers are politi-
cally undesirable (Ponomareva and Zhuravskaya, 2004). The central question then becomes who 
is effectively controlling tax authorities in the regions. 
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Moreover, strategic tax auditing and collection could be used as a way of de facto fiscal 
decentralization. Throughout this paper we define fiscal decentralization as an increase of the tax 
retention rate, i.e. the share of tax revenue generated from a certain territory obtained by the re-
gional government. It is not the de jure tax retention rate which is interesting for us, but the de 
facto share of revenue, which can be influenced by different factors, among others by strategic 
tax collection. Moreover, in this sense decentralization can vary among different regions. As au-
diting effort is often not directly observable, it could create a principal-agent problem. There is no 
reason to believe that regions (if they control tax auditing activities) are equally thorough to en-
force tax laws, when a larger share of tax revenue collected is attributed to the federal govern-
ment, as compared to taxes, which mostly benefit regional budgets. It is thus possible to hypothe-
size that tax arrears would mostly accumulate on the expense of the federal centre, i.e. taxes with 
a higher regional share are more actively collected than those which are mostly attributed to the 
centre. On the contrary, the federal centre can also be interested in the “hidden” re-centralization 
through strategic tax collection. In this sense the behavior of the tax authorities is strategic, i.e. 
distribution of effort between different taxes is not random, but rationally determined through the 
interaction of the regional/ federal governments and the tax administrators. 
In this paper we test hypotheses on strategic tax collection empirically using data of the 
Russian Federation. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to empirically investigate 
strategic tax collection. There are several factors, which make Russia an interesting case for such 
an analysis. First, during the 1990s, tax collection in Russia experienced a significant decline; the 
situation improved in the 2000s under the new administration, but the share of the shadow econ-
omy still remains significant. Therefore selective application of tax collection instruments seems 
to be a reasonable assumption for the behavior of tax authorities in this environment (as com-
pared to countries with high tax morale). Second, Russian regions are suspect of manipulating tax 
collection throughout the 1990s: both because of a de jure highly centralized federal structure, but 
de facto increasing unilateral devolution. Third, changes of tax collection behavior from Yeltsin 
to Putin make Russian federalism an important laboratory, which can be used to understand how 
shifts of relative bargaining power between the centre and the regions affect tax auditing and col-
lection behavior. However, the downside of studying Russia consists in potential difficulties by 
modeling Russian federalism econometrically. On the one hand, Russia has been an extremely 
asymmetric country both in terms of political, economic and fiscal structure. This suggests a po-
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tential impact of influential cases on the estimation results. On the other hand, transition from 
Yeltsin to Putin can pose additional modeling problems, for example the timing of changes. We 
employ a variety of estimation techniques to account for these challenges. 
This paper is related to the empirical literature dealing with institutional and political de-
terminants of tax arrears in Russia. Ponomareva and Zhuravskaya (2004) apply a micro-level ap-
proach based on individual data on tax arrears of about one thousand firms in 1997 and 1998 and 
find higher federal tax arrears (controlling for liquidity) for regions with a stronger bargaining 
position against the centre, with higher support of governors in the last elections and with higher 
tensions in relations between governors and the centre. Treisman (1999) also presents a study of 
42 enterprises in 1994-1997 and finds that in regions with a lower share of the federal centre in 
total tax revenue in the previous year companies pay higher taxes as share of reported pre-tax in-
come. Slinko, Yakovlev and Zhuravskaya (2005) study a set of Russian regions in 1996-2000 and 
argue that state capture is associated with an increase of federal tax arrears, but does not have any 
significant influence on regional tax arrears. Finally, Yakovlev (2006) presents some anecdotal 
evidence of tax auditing as a tool in horizontal tax competition and Plekhanov (2006) shows for a 
sample of 79 regions in 1998-1999 that protecting enterprises from taxation seemed to be an im-
portant instrument to attract mobile capital. Most of the papers, however, do not specifically look 
at the interaction between tax arrears and the retention rates and therefore do not test for strategic 
tax collection as instrument of fiscal decentralization. 
In the latter respect our paper is complementary to Treisman (2003), who discusses the in-
fluence of decentralization on tax arrears. The analysis by Treisman (2003) covers the period of 
1994-1997 and is mostly based on region-level data. According to his results, regions with larger 
enterprises tend to have higher tax arrears, the election of a Communist governor is positively 
correlated with tax arrears, and territories in which the share of regional government increased 
most in the previous year had lower growth of tax arrears. His approach is, hence, quite different 
from ours; he considers the size of tax arrears as an outcome of fiscal decentralization in the past. 
The idea is that observing its retention rate the regional governments make the decision with re-
spect to their tax auditing and collection effort. Though probably applicable for the early period 
of development of the Russian Federation, this approach, however, seems to be less reliable if we 
consider its later political-economic structure based on administrative federalism – the reason for 
our choice of studying Russia in the first place! In a centralized federation, de jure retention rates 
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are identical for all regions (as it is the case for Russia); differences in retention rates (fiscal 
asymmetries) arise from differences in economic structure predetermining the tax base and the 
activity of tax collection agencies, i.e. tax auditing and tax collection. This line of causality is al-
so of greater scientific importance, it is applicable not just to Russia, but is a general issue of cen-
tralized federations. Moreover, unlike Treisman, we attempt to find out, how strategic tax collec-
tion changed during the evolution of Russian federalism in the 1990s and 2000s. Our data set 
covers the period between 1995 and 2006, and therefore does not only include the first term of 
Yeltsin’s presidency, but also his second term and a significant part of Putin’s first and second 
terms. To our knowledge, this paper is thus also one of the first attempts to apply tools of empiri-
cal research to explicitly studying the changes in Russian fiscal federalism under Putin in the 
2000s.  
The paper is organized as follows: the next section describes the basic logic of strategic 
application of tax collection instruments in centralized federations with different allocations of de 
facto bargaining power between levels of government. It also clarifies the concepts of tax audit-
ing and tax collection as they are used in this paper. The third section provides a brief overview 
of Russian federalism, the reasons for strategic tax collection in this institutional setting and pre-
sents our main hypotheses. The fourth section describes the data, and the fifths section discusses 
the econometric methodology. The sixths section presents our findings for the main steps of anal-
ysis (panel data, TSLS and median regressions) and discusses their potential implications. The 
sevenths section deals with an additional robustness check, based on the number of tax audits car-
ried out by the local branches of the Russian tax collecting authority. The last section offers some 
conclusions.  
2. Tax auditing and tax collection in a centralized federation 
We start with considering a general (and unavoidably simplified) setting, which should 
then be adapted for the institutional specifics of the Russian case. The existing literature on stra-
tegic tax auditing (see e.g. Stöwhase and Traxler, 2005) models the auditing effort as a probabil-
ity p of detection of tax evasion (which is a choice variable for the tax authority given that the tax 
rate is exogenous). For our purposes we transform the concept as follows. Assume that there ex-
ists a population of firms in the economy with overall real profit πR (instead of profit one could 
consider any other tax base); however, the officially declared profit, which should be used as the 
tax base, is πD < πR. The government does not take the declarations of firms for granted and im-
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plements the tax auditing measures in order to find out the real profit. Then on average, assuming 
the detection probability p, the uncovered profit of the firms after tax auditing is πD + (πR - πD)p. 
For any p < 1 (i.e. when the auditing is imperfect) the detected profit after tax auditing is smaller, 
than real profit.  
 
Declared  
tax base 
πD 
Uncovered tax base used 
for calculation of tax due 
(πR - πD)pr 
Uncovered tax base, which could 
not be proven in court or where 
execution procedure failed – tax 
arrears (πR - πD)p(1-r) 
Not uncovered tax 
avoidance 
(πR - πD)(1-p) 
Hidden part of the tax base 
πR - πD 
Total tax base πR  
Figure 1: Tax base after tax collection and tax auditing activities 
However, it would be too simple to assume, that the government is indeed able to tax the 
detected profit. The results of tax auditing are usually subject to lawsuits and further execution 
procedures by law-enforcement agencies, i.e. to tax collection activity. Loopholes in tax laws in 
developing or transition countries and extreme complexity of the tax system in many developed 
countries provide for large opportunities to challenge the results of tax auditing. However, the 
decision of the court heavily depends upon the effort invested in preparing the case by the prose-
cutor, i.e. the tax authority. Moreover, in a developing or transition economy with poor rule of 
law the enforcement procedure is also non-trivial and requires additional investments. So, there is 
yet another choice variable for the tax authority: the probability of collecting the detected tax 
(say, r). Then the tax base used for calculating the taxes due is in fact πD+(πR–πD)pr, while the 
difference between this tax base and the detected tax base (1–r)p(πR–πD) represents the uncol-
lected tax arrears. The structure of the tax base is represented in Figure 1. Naturally, the situation 
can be much more sophisticated, if time delays and fines are taken into account.  
In order to describe the application of tax collection and auditing in a federation we con-
sider a simple principal-agent framework, where a local tax authority (agent) acts on behalf of 
two principals: the federal and the local (regional) governments (as both gain from tax collec-
tion). The results of the agent’s activity depend upon his effort and the environmental characteris-
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tics. Agent’s utility is derived from potential benefits provided by the principals (e.g. direct (for-
mal and informal payments), non-monetary benefits, career advancements etc.). Obviously, nega-
tive benefits (punishments) are possible. On the other hand, an agent’s activity is constrained by 
his resources, which could be used for tax auditing and collecting effort, i.e. tax service (given its 
resources) is unable to collect the total taxes due anyway. We assume that the resources for tax 
auditing and collection are exogenous. Moreover, the agent can choose between allocating effort 
in auditing and collection of “federal” or “regional” taxes (or taxes with a higher share of the fed-
eral or the regional governments). However, this allocation decision is only partly observable by 
the principals, whose monitoring capacity is unequal. Hence, the principals cannot completely 
distinguish between the results of the agent’s activity caused by environmental characteristics or 
by allocation of his effort. Each principal maximizes his own tax revenue regardless of the reve-
nue of the other principal (of course, in the real world federation may care for regional tax collec-
tion – then, however, we simply do not find the effect in the empirical application). The agent’s 
benefits depend upon the principal’s assessment of the agent’s efforts for collecting taxes attrib-
uted to this principal regardless of total tax auditing and collecting effort. Note that there is no 
incentive for the agent to reduce her overall effort, since it only reduces the benefits; so, the deci-
sion variable is the allocation of tax collecting activity. 
This setting gives rise to at least two alternative scenarios (which, as shown below, corre-
spond to two phases of development of the Russian federalism). In the region-centered environ-
ment the regional government has a double advantage over the federal centre: first, it has better 
instruments to observe both effort and environmental conditions and, second, it has a relative ad-
vantage in bargaining power. Hence, the benefits from the regional government are higher than 
those provided by the federal government (and potential punishment also exceeds that of the fed-
eral centre), as regional governments can effectively “protect” the agent from potential federal 
punishment, and its resources for punishment and the benefits for the agent exceed those of the 
federal centre. Moreover, the agent’s ability to “cheat” is higher with respect to the federal centre 
than with respect to the region. Thus, it is more likely that the agent directs his efforts in a way to 
better satisfy the requirements of the local than the federal principal. Assume further that differ-
ent agents in different regions face different tax collection constraints (because of economic het-
erogeneity of regions); however, the federal centre is “equally weak” vis-à-vis different regions.  
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 Since the tax revenue potentially originating from the tax base generated by the economy 
is not fully collected by the tax authorities, enterprises form tax arrears (both formally claimed by 
the tax collection service and successfully “hidden” from the state, i.e. (1–r)p(πR–πD) and (1–
p)(πR–πD)). Then, strategic tax collection and auditing influence the distribution of tax arrears: tax 
arrears are larger for taxes, which are less thoroughly collected (given similar tax bases). From 
this point of view one can claim that under the conditions described above tax arrears for regional 
taxes are smaller than those for federal taxes (note, that in a setting with joint taxes the distinction 
is less strict; one can rather argue, that taxes are more or less attractive for the federal or regional 
governments). If tax arrears accumulate to the detriment of federal taxes, the ratio of federal taxes 
to total taxes collected goes down (since both the numerator and the denominator are equally af-
fected), resulting in effective fiscal decentralization (as defined above). Ceteris paribus, regions 
with higher tax arrears therefore achieve higher fiscal decentralization. Obviously, bargaining 
power of the federal centre also varies differently in centre-region relations. Hence, for the sake 
of the empirical analysis, one has to control for potential political variables influencing the ability 
and the willingness of the regions to bargain with the federal centre in order to establish the ce-
teris paribus condition (i.e. the price of decentralization as defined by Congleton et al., 2003). 
The second (federation-centered) scenario implies a shift of the bargaining power balance 
to the federal centre and an increase of its monitoring abilities. Hence, the incentives for the agent 
are reversed: it can derive higher utility (from benefits and avoiding punishments) from directing 
tax collection and auditing effort into federal taxes. Note, that there are no changes of agent’s or 
principals’ utility functions in this setting: we assume only changes of monitoring capacity and 
bargaining power. The shifts of strategic tax auditing and collection behavior result from actions 
of the agent facing constraints of limited ability to collect taxes in general, while the principal’s 
action has only an indirect impact (from bargaining over “protecting” the agent from the punish-
ment by another principal). The logic is exactly reverse to that of the region-centered case: tax 
arrears are mostly accumulated on costs of regional governments; in the ratio of federal tax reve-
nue to total tax revenue the increase of tax arrears affects the denominator much stronger than the 
numerator, and the regions with higher tax arrears achieve lower fiscal decentralization.  
A simple model can be helpful to understand this reasoning. Consider a region in a fed-
eration, where two taxes with strictly separate tax bases are collected. Denote the contested tax 
bases as TL for the local (regional) tax and TC for the central (federal) tax (i.e. the portion of the 
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overall tax bases for taxes L and C claimed by the tax authority, but rejected by the taxpayer) and 
the declared and uncontested tax bases as ULT and 
U
CT  respectively (i.e. the portion of the overall 
tax base which is accepted by both taxpayer and tax authority). Therefore ( ) iDiRii pT ππ −=  and 
D
i
U
iT π= , where { }CLi ;∈ . We disregard the tax auditing activity and focus on tax collection (in 
fact, both tax auditing and tax collection run in the same direction, so this simplification is possi-
ble). The tax rates of both taxes for the tax bases are constant and exogenous τ (the equal tax rates 
are without loss of generality). The coefficients αC and αL measure the monitoring capacity and 
bargaining power of respective governments (which, in fact, run in the same direction in our sto-
ry); eL and eC denotes the tax collection effort of the tax authority to collect the regional and the 
federal tax respectively, so that tax arrears a(.) are functions of respective efforts. We focus on 
strategic tax collection: so, both principals and the agent know the tax base. There is no effort ne-
cessary for collecting the uncontested tax base. Tax arrears are defined as a share of the tax base, 
so that the collected tax for the government i is ( )( ) ( ) iiDiRiii rpTea ππ −= −1  and a(ei) = 1–ri. The 
overall tax collection effort in the region is constrained by a certain level E, so that eC + eL = E.  
Therefore the problem for the tax collection authority can be written as follows: 
( )
.
;
;
..
;;max
;
LL
CC
LC
CLCLee
Ee
Ee
Eee
ts
eecee CL
CL
≤
≤
=+
−+ αα
 
where c(.) denotes the cost of tax collection, which is increasing and strictly concave in both ar-
guments (the functional form of influence of alphas on the function is without loss of generality: 
any increasing function of respective e and alpha would suffice; in a similar way, c(.) is simply a 
differentiable continuous function, which may as well be a function of the sum of eC and eL). The 
reason for the construction of the objective function is that the principals (federal and regional 
governments) provide benefits/ punishments according to the efforts of the tax authority for 
“their” own tax. The last two restrictions ensure that there is no need to increase tax collection 
efforts beyond a certain threshold (simply speaking, when the tax base is completely collected). 
We assume that at least one of these conditions is binding: otherwise there is a certain tax base, 
which the tax collection authority is not able to collect at all. Obviously, the problem has a corner 
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solution: for αL > αC the tax collection authority invests its efforts only in regional tax collection, 
and vice versa. Only if the respective tax collection is complete (one of the last two conditions is 
binding), the authority proceeds with investing in tax collection of the weaker government. The 
share of the regional government in overall tax collection is then denoted by: 
( )( )
( )( ) ( )( ) CCLLUCUL
LL
U
L
TeaTeaTT
TeaTs −+−++
−+=
11
1 . 
Consider four regions, which are denoted A, B, C and D. All regions have identical tax bases for 
both taxes, and therefore TL, TC, EL and EC are the same. Regions A and C have identical (large) 
overall tax arrears a(eL)TL + a(eC)TC, and regions B and D have identical (small) tax arrears, so 
that tax arrears of A are larger than of B. A and B have higher bargaining power vis-à-vis the fed-
eral centre and αL > αC, and for regions C and D the opposite holds. Therefore, differences in tax 
arrears between A and B and C and D arise through the overall restriction on tax effort E (which 
is larger by the second region in each pair). Considering regions A and B (the region-centered 
scenario) it is straightforward that they both collect the total regional tax and form federal tax ar-
rears: then A has larger federal tax arrears than B, and both have identical (zero) regional tax ar-
rears (this is of course an extreme simplification of reality, where regional tax arrears can arise 
even in spite of effort invested by the respective government – from the empirical point of view 
one can look at it as the “noise” in the data); hence sA > sB (where the superscript denotes the re-
spective region), On the contrary, for C and D (the federation-centered case) both regions have 
identical (zero) federal tax arrears and C has larger regional tax arrears than D. Then sD > sC. 
 As we show in the next section, these two statements give rise to two hypotheses we can 
test. In fact, one could say that in a federation-centered case a region with huge tax arrears is ex-
tremely centralized, and in a region-centered case the same region with the same tax arrears is 
extremely decentralized. However, any empirical specification has to control for differences in 
tax bases and in bargaining power. Obviously, the retention rate per se is of secondary impor-
tance, since the government is looking at the absolute size of its budget. It is hence important to 
notice that the “fiscal decentralization” as defined in this section is just a by-product of the deci-
sions of governments, motivated by the desire to increase their overall fiscal revenue, which can, 
however, be used in an empirical study to identify the behavior of interest. 
3.  Strategic tax collection and Russian fiscal federalism 
3.1. Formal institutions and asymmetries in retention rates 
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The ideal playground for studying the strategic tax collection problems should, as it fol-
lows from our previous discussion, have two main features: high centralization of formal fiscal 
authorities (but possible decentralization of tax administration) and high external constraints 
(low E) making manipulation with tax collection effort attractive. In what follows we will try to 
show that Russian federalism indeed meets these two criteria.1  
In the early 1990s, the share of taxes attributed to the federal centre in the Russian Federa-
tion was set individually for every region and all issues of inter-budgetary relations were deter-
mined by negotiations between regions and the centre. The split of tax revenue was set for each 
tax and region annually (or even on a quarterly basis). When the president managed to consoli-
date power on the federal level after the dissolution of the old parliament (Supreme Council) in 
autumn 1993, the situation changed; the new constitution of 1993 accompanied by basic acts on 
inter-budgetary relations in 1994 established the de jure assignment of responsibilities and of tax 
revenues between different levels of government. The new Russian federalism was based on a 
high degree of centralization of tax authorities. The exclusive list of taxes was set by the federal 
parliament, originally in the Law on the Fundamentals of the Tax System, and after 1999 in the 
Tax Code. There was one notable exception from this regulation: the Presidential Decree No. 
2268 signed on December 22, 1993, allowed the regional and local authorities to introduce own 
taxes. However, though several regions used these possibilities, most taxes introduced by the re-
gions did not even cover their administrative expenses (although they still influenced economic 
processes as they were used to manipulate competition between businesses to support privileged 
business groups, see East-West Institute, 2001). In 1996 the Decree was abolished, and although 
some regions continued using their “own” taxes, their influence on tax revenue was fairly low. 
The federal government also set the rules for calculating the tax base for all taxes. Consequently, 
there is only one unified tax collection system in Russia; all taxes are administered by the federal 
government.2  
So, de jure the only source of fiscal asymmetries in tax revenue assignment could be dif-
ferences in the tax base endowments (any changes of federal legislation, like new tax rates or new 
taxes simultaneously hit all regions). Indeed, this de jure highly centralized federal order was im-
plemented in an extremely heterogeneous country. Different regions of Russia are characterized 
                                                          
1 In what follows we refer only to the revenue side of the fiscal structure. The expenditures side, which has been 
more decentralized, is outside the scope of this paper. 
2 Some details on Russian tax system are described in Appendix E. 
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by different resource endowments and industrial capacities, different population structures and 
different access to transportation infrastructure and markets. The asymmetries in tax revenue dis-
tribution have been enormous. In the period between 1994 and 2006 the share of taxes received 
by the centre from different regions varied from practically zero (Sakha in 1994 and 1995) to 
more than 95% (Kalmykia and Voronezh in 2005). Figure 2 presents the distribution of Russian 
regions according to their share in the tax revenue from their territory. The question is, however, 
whether the tax base composition is the only factor driving the heterogeneity.  
 
Figure 2: Distribution of regions according to the retention rates. 
Sources: Goskomstat, Ministry of Finance, Federal Tax Service, Federal Treasury, Freinkman, 
Treisman and Titov, 1999 
One factor to explain fiscal asymmetries in Russia could be a strong political asymmetry 
resulting from the effort of Russian regions to achieve greater autonomy. Partly this activity took 
place within the framework of direct bilateral bargaining between federal and regional govern-
ments, leading to the establishment of formal power-sharing treaties which are often referred to 
as elements of an asymmetric federation (Filippov, Ordeshook and Shvetsova, 2004, Chapter 4). 
On the other hand, federal law (parliamentary acts and presidential decrees) was used to give ad-
ditional authorities to regions. More important is the unilateral activity of regions leading to 
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devolution. Its most prominent forms included “the war of laws” (introduction of regional legisla-
tion running contrary to the federal one) or decisions to prevent the local tax authorities from 
transferring the tax revenue to the federal government – a kind of “tax separatism”. 
However, a closer look reveals that political asymmetries and open conflicts could hardly 
influence the distribution of tax revenue. Although the significant differences between federal 
and local regulation existed until the early 2000s (Chang, 2005), the possibilities for the regions 
to manipulate the transfer of tax revenue to the federal government went down relatively quickly. 
While in 1993 about 30 regions declared plans to “withhold” the federal share in tax revenue, not 
a single one really implemented them. In 1996 St. Petersburg was the only region withholding 
20% of the land tax revenue. There were only seldom attempts of open “budgetary separatism” in 
the 1990s. After the crisis of 1998 several regions announced the decision to block the federal 
portion of tax revenue, and the parliament of Kalmykia (one of the national republics in the 
Southern part of Russia) decided to stop payments to the federal budget, but quick and severe ac-
tions of the federal centre (e.g. the Ministry of Finance stopped funding federal programs on the 
Kalmykian territory) resulted in abolition of this regulation. Moreover, the major advantages ob-
tained by the regions in bilateral treaties were of non-fiscal nature – control over oil and gas ex-
ploration in Tatarstan and Bashkortostan or for the diamond industry in Sakha. The first two trea-
ties with Tatarstan and Bashkortostan allowed these republics to receive all royalties from the 
natural resources instead of federal centre. However, Sakha, the third region, was only able to 
enforce the special privileged regime to use part of the federal taxes collected on its territory for 
the funding of federal programs, i.e. a limitation was put rather on the expenditure than the reve-
nue side of the budget. Later treaties either did not include any fiscal arrangements or were most-
ly based on the Sakha scheme (if they included any fiscal aspect at all).  
Finally, the political asymmetry went down in the 2000s under the new administration of 
Vladimir Putin. One of the first acts of the new president was to regain control over the federal 
political structures in regions (what was called “strengthening the vertical of power”): in 2000 
seven new federal districts were established in which presidential representatives (mostly with a 
background in the military or security service) obtained the right to oversee the selection and 
placement of personnel in local branches of federal authorities (Ross, 2003). Furthermore, re-
gional governors lost a significant part of their influence because of institutional changes (like the 
reform of the upper chamber of the Russian parliament, the Federal Council, or the right of the 
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president to remove a governor from his office; see Hyde, 2001) accompanied by a strong public 
support for the new president. Meanwhile the degree of asymmetry between regions in tax distri-
bution remained significant: Magadan was able to get about 98% in 2003 of the whole tax reve-
nue and may be compared with the most “secessionist” republics of the early 1990s. Indeed, the 
standard deviation of shares of tax collection de facto attributed to regional budgets increased 
significantly in the last six years (Figure 3). 
 
Figure 3: Standard deviation of the region’s share in the tax revenue from its territory  
Sources: Goskomstat, Ministry of Finance, Federal Tax Service, Federal Treasury; Freinkman, 
Treisman and Titov (1999) 
 
3.2. Manipulation of tax collection effort 
 Throughout the last two decades the tax collection in Russia remains a difficult task.  
First, Russia experienced increasing tax evasion in the first ten years of transition resulting from a 
deficit of current financial assets and the so-called “mutual arrears networks” (unsettled claims of 
enterprises persisting for years) of the early 1990s, of low tax morale and of a legitimacy deficit 
of the state as well as inefficient enforcement (see e.g. Yakovlev, 1999, Wintrobe, 2001 or Alm et 
al., 2006). In 2002-2003 the share of the shadow economy accounted for 48.7% of Russian GDP 
(Schneider, 2005). After 2000, a consolidation of government (with increasing pressure of tax 
authorities and state-loyal decisions of courts), internationalization of Russian businesses requir-
ing an increase in transparency (Yakovlev, 2005) and advancements in tax reform (Jones Luong 
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and Weinthal, 2004) seem to have made evasion less attractive. Moreover, the tax burden was 
weakened by the introduction of the flat tax on personal income. Although empirical studies on 
its effect are inconclusive (Ivanova, Keen and Klemm, 2005), it appears that it mainly affected 
tax revenue because it has facilitated tax collection and thus reduced the extent of tax evasion. 
After a permanent increase of tax arrears as a share of GDP or budget tax revenue, this indicator 
seems to go down since 1999 (Figure 4).  
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Figure 4: Tax arrears in the Russian Federation (as of December 31 of respective year) 
Source: Goskomstat 
Nevertheless, tax evasion remained an important problem for the Russian economy. Even in 
2003-2004 it exceeded 40% of taxes paid when considering the so-called “spacemen schemes” 
(which include the creation of a short-life firm) of an average firm only (Mironov, 2006). 
 In the world of huge tax evasion, tax collection authority is obviously unable to track any 
hidden source of revenue. However, not only the tax audit was problematic; tax collection has 
also not been an easy task because of huge enforcement problems enforcement problems for the 
tax administration (Shleifer and Treisman, 2000). In fact, in the 1990s companies often voluntar-
ily declared tax arrears (i.e. claimed but unpaid portion of taxes), since the general deficit of li-
quidity and the virtually absent bankruptcy law allowed them to operate even without paying the 
taxes, which they recognized. The latter became subject of various “mutual recognition” 
schemes, i.e. joint cancellation of fiscal claim of the government to the enterprise (for the re-
gional portion of taxes) and of government’s debt to the enterprise (e.g. for goods and services), 
often providing substantial gains to (mostly regional) bureaucrats and politicians, not only in 
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providing substantial gains to (mostly regional) bureaucrats and politicians, not only in form of 
individual payments, but also through re-allocation of control over attractive assets and financial 
flows for themselves and their privileged companies or electoral support (Treisman, 1998; Kuz-
netsova et al., 2002).  
On first sight, this setting seems to be a violation of the basic model described in the pre-
vious section; however, in fact it just shifts the problem of tax collector on a different level. In-
stead of finding out the “hidden” tax base the issue is to force the enterprises to comply with a 
specific scheme of settlement for tax debt allowing the government to receive certain gains from 
the taxpayer. Once again, in an environment where liquidity deficit is omnipresent, the tax collec-
tor has to allocate its effort to force the taxpayer to comply with a settlement scheme preferred by 
a certain principal. In fact, the only difference is that as a result of strategic tax collection pre-
ferred principal receives not the fiscal revenue, but other benefits, while the arrears disappear 
through mutual recognition. The other principal remains with her own tax arrears. Obviously, in 
this environment tax audit is irrelevant, but tax collection is still a problem. Moreover, the recog-
nition schemes were often an outcome of bargaining. Pappe (2002) suggests that governmental 
agencies were likely to lose in a confrontation with private businesses during the period studied 
(including tax matters); however, if consolidated, they were able to succeed in any conflict. Thus, 
the efforts with respect to negotiations over concerted action of different agencies could be also 
manipulated, heavily affecting results.  
Though the issue of claims settlement became less important since the liquidity crisis 
went down, the “traditional” problem of “finding out” the “true” tax base also remained a huge 
issue for the Russian tax collecting authorities throughout the last two decades (under both Yel-
tsin and Putin). In this setting, strategic tax collection also played an important role. As men-
tioned above, one of the channels of strategic tax collection is the allocation of efforts in lawsuits. 
In Russia, a lawsuit in taxation matters has not just been a formal step, as one probably would 
expect given the low degree of judicial independence in Russia: Russian tax authorities are 
notorious for a relatively low success rate in the court. This is true not only for the period of the 
“weak state” under Yeltsin, but also (contrary to the common belief) under Putin. According to 
the data provided by the federal tax authority itself, in 2001-2005 72% of all disputes were settled 
in favor of the taxpayers. Moreover, even weighting by the size of the claim, the rate of success 
of taxpayers in 2001-2003 exceeds 60% (and reaches 80% in 2002), though it decreases to less 
than 50% in 2004 and 32% in 2005.3 In a random selection of 160 deals in transfer pricing mat-
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50% in 2004 and 32% in 2005.3 In a random selection of 160 deals in transfer pricing matters in 
2002-2004 tax authorities lost about 84%, mostly because of lacking evidence and bad docu-
mental backing of deals (Rodionov, 2005). The officials are often not thorough enough while 
preparing the documents for the court. This effort is, however, crucial for the outcome of the le-
gal procedure. Hence, manipulating this effort in an environment of large tax avoidance, tax au-
thorities can pursue the goals of strategic tax collection.4  Notice, that although individual claims 
of the tax authority might as well be erroneous (or used as a source of rent-seeking of uncon-
trolled bureaucrats), in aggregate in an economy with huge tax avoidance they are likely to be 
correct. 
To conclude, there are reasons to believe that the Russian federalism meets two main re-
quirements for studying strategic tax collection. However, these requirements are sufficient to 
expect the presence of strategic tax collection, but not enough to predict the potential main bene-
ficiary of the strategic tax collection (and therefore identify the federation-centered and region-
centered designs, necessary to formulate empirical hypotheses). This is what we will attempt in 
the following subsection. 
 
3.3. Informal practices and tax collection under Yeltsin and Putin 
The discussion of the fiscal federalism in Russia under Yeltsin makes it reasonable to look 
for instruments which are able to establish a link between economic heterogeneity and political 
asymmetry to fiscal asymmetry. From this point of view the de jure structure of the tax system 
should be confronted with the de facto organization of tax collection and distribution in Russia. 
Technically speaking, the federal tax administration collects all tax payments from individuals 
and legal entities on an account in the Federal Treasury (Kaznacheistvo) that are then distributed 
between different governments and governmental entities. That means that all regional govern-
ments just receive their portion of tax revenue from the federal tax service (Lavrov, 2005). The 
                                                          
3   By the way, this difference also supports our idea of strategic tax collection: obviously, tax authorities seem to 
put more effort in disputes with larger prize to win. 
4  The fact that tax authorities often address taxpayers with claims which they cannot justify is acknowledged by the 
high-ranking officials of the Ministry of Finance (see e.g. the interview of Ilya Trunin, head of the Department of 
Tax Policy, to polit.ru, 2008, January 17). Often the tax administrators are guided by a formal or informal plan, 
setting their goals to the “overall tax collection”, and therefore have clear incentives to set higher claims, given 
their effort to collect them cannot be monitored completely. Even an unjustified claim is not “completely lost” for 
the tax authority. The taxpayer also compares the expenses of a legal process to defend her rights (involving sub-
stantial costs) and the benefits; in case of a smaller claim the decision could be just to “pay and forget”. However, 
the costs for a taxpayer depend on the efforts the tax administrators put into their claim. 
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federal tax service does formally not rely on regional administrations from the point of view of 
tax collection or enforcement, nor does it require any cooperation from the regional governments. 
There are also no regional law enforcement agencies (several attempts to introduce a “municipal 
militia” were crushed by the federal centre) and no regional courts. 
However, the real bureaucracy of the federal tax service does not operate as smoothly as 
prescribed by the law. The main reasons for that are typical for the Russian bureaucracy in gen-
eral (and, actually, for most bureaucracies of developing and transition countries): low qualifica-
tion of public officials, often abuses of power by public officials, high corruption etc. In this im-
perfect world regions could use a variety of strategies to shift revenue in favor of their budgets, 
e.g. “monetary surrogates” and non-cash tax collection, extra-budgetary financial establishments 
with quasi-mandatory contributions of private entities etc. Some of these institutions flourished in 
the 1990s, while others managed to survive in the 2000s, and have been well studied in the litera-
ture (e.g. Genkin, 2000, Lavrov et al., 2001, Gaddy and Ickes, 2002). We focus on one particular 
strategy, which could drive the development of the retention rates, i.e. the “capture” of local tax 
administrations by the regional governments. Regional politicians and bureaucrats were able to 
develop personal relations with the officials of tax services, who, because of absent territorial ro-
tation, stayed in their offices for years. Given the bad federal financing of the public service, re-
gions could provide additional benefits for the employees of regional tax collection authorities 
(e.g. housing assistance). Finally, although formally tax administrators were completely autono-
mous, in reality the cooperation of regional governments was quite helpful or even necessary to 
deal with large taxpayers with significant political capital which became an issue of bargaining 
between governments and agencies (Enikopolov et al., 2000; Dabla-Norris et al., 2000). This en-
vironment facilitated the emergence of tax arrears.  
Of course, it would be farfetched to claim that all regional tax authorities were success-
fully “captured” by the regional governments: in fact, conflicts between regional governments 
and federal branches were also present. However, capture seems to be an important factor 
determining the behavior of a great number of local tax collecting agencies. Moreover, the use of 
different strategies may be complementary. For example, the abovementioned “mutual 
recognitions” for regional portions of tax arrears seem to have significantly exceeded those for 
federal portions of tax arrears, thus, once again, reproducing the de-facto fiscal decentralization 
result (see Schetnaya Palata, 2000); in order to facilitate mutual recognition schemes (and to get 
benefits from them) governments used quasi-money, extra-budgetary funds etc. However, the 
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them) governments used quasi-money, extra-budgetary funds etc. However, the support of tax 
authority is of course key to any endeavor dealing with taxes calculated according to the law. 
Anyway, the environment observed in the Russian Federation in the 1990s resembles the region-
centered setting described in Section 2; therefore the following hypothesis could be formulated. 
Hypothesis 1: In the 1990s (under Yeltsin’s presidency) regions with higher tax 
arrears are more likely to exhibit ceteris paribus higher fiscal decentralization in 
terms of tax revenue attributed to the federal centre.  
As already mentioned, political changes under the administration of Putin seem to reduce 
the willingness and the ability to manipulate taxation in favor of the regions. Nevertheless, the tax 
avoidance remained huge, and there is also no evidence that the quality of bureaucracy in Russia 
increased. Given the shifts of bargaining power between the federal centre and the regions one 
could thus expect that the strategic tax collection behaviour changes in line with the second (fed-
eration-centred) setting, giving rise to the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: In the 2000s (under Putin’s presidency) regions with higher tax 
arrears are more likely to exhibit ceteris paribus lower fiscal decentralization in 
terms of tax revenue attributed to the federal centre. 
In fact, the measures of the federal centre to improve monitoring and control over regional 
branches of federal ministries seems to set incentives necessary for the local tax authorities. Con-
sider the most obvious way of providing incentives for the local officials: personnel policy. Un-
fortunately, there is no empirical evidence with respect to personnel changes in the regional tax 
authorities. However, there is some anecdotal evidence from other regional branches of federal 
law enforcing agencies, that the federal government started an active personnel restructuring 
since 2001 in order to ensure higher loyalty of regional authorities to the federal centre and to 
break the informal connections between local governments and local branches of federal agen-
cies. For example, in 2001 the Federal Ministry of Internal Affairs (which is also responsible for 
the police in Russia) changed the heads of its regional branches in 7 regions; in 2002 it were 13 
regions, in 2003 25 regions and in 2004 22 regions. Most successors of the heads of regional po-
lice offices were not appointed from the regional staff, like it used to be the case in the 1990s; 
mostly they came from other regions or from the federal bodies of the Ministry (Voronov, 2005, 
see also Petrov, 2009 for other federal authorities). It is likely, that other local branches of federal 
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ministries expected similar changes (which were only partly reported by the press). But even if 
there were no direct changes in the tax collection service since 2000, the very experience of other 
ministries and services could have a strong impact on the behavior of regional authorities.  
 However, the principal-agent framework presented above does not provide any arguments 
regarding strategic tax collection under increasing centralization, typical for Putin’s presidency. 
On the contrary, since the influence of regional authorities went down, there seem to be no rea-
sons for continuing strategic tax collection; the federal government, regaining control over re-
gional tax authorities, could implement its aims through formal legislation (and indeed, the tax 
reforms since 2000 partly aimed at increasing the share of tax collection attributed to the federal 
government). An alternative point of view is offered by the discussion of the semi-authoritarian 
regime in Russia, mostly originating from political sciences. The main idea of the approach is to 
differentiate between “classical” authoritarianism, in which the central government is able to en-
force its objectives against other political groups via direct pressure, and the “hybrid regime”, or 
“semi-authoritarianism”, in which the central government enforces its aims through indirect or 
hidden channels, imitating the “formal” democratic framework of developed countries (Olcott 
and Ottaway, 1999; Levitsky and Way, 2002; Furman, 2007). Technically, one assumes the addi-
tional constraints for the federal centre to change the institutional environment in its favor.  
This “imitation” results from a variety of reasons. First, unlike “classical” authoritarian 
regimes, semi-authoritarian governments have a vested interest in the integration in the interna-
tional community and hence in complying with the rules of democratic societies (at least for-
mally). Second, it can follow from a relatively weak power concentration (as compared to “clas-
sical” authoritarianism”), which makes the use of “indirect channels of control” inevitable. The 
idea is that of the “blackmail state” described by Darden (2001): the federal government is inter-
ested in semi-illicit activities of regions to obtain an additional instrument of control. Formal 
redistribution of tax revenue between the centre and the regions could be politically undesirable 
after certain thresholds are passed; so, the federal centre may also be interested in strategic tax 
auditing as a “hidden” instrument to ensure the re-centralization goals while formally complying 
with the “rules of conduct” established for democratic federations in the international community. 
Hence, the semi-authoritarian approach also provides some background for Hypothesis 2. 
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4. Data 
 Our analysis covers the period of 1995-2006 (12 years), which includes practically the 
whole history of Russian federalism – from the period of “regional feudalism” in the mid 1990s 
to the current “vertical of power” under President Putin. The analysis covers all regions of the 
Russian Federation excluding nine autonomous okrugs5 and the Chechen Republic for which no 
reliable data are available. Thus, we observe 79 regions annually.6 Following the discussion 
above, we estimate the influence of tax arrears (as explanatory variable and proxy for tax collec-
tion efforts) on the distribution of tax revenue between the centre and the regions, controlling for 
alternative factors. From Hypotheses 1 and 2 we expect a positive sign of tax arrears in the re-
gressions with fiscal decentralization as dependent variable in Yeltsin’s governing period and a 
negative sign in the Putin period. 
The empirical regression estimated is specified as follows: 
SHARE =  α0 + α1 ARREARS+ α2TAX_STRUCTURE + α3 LEGAL_CONTROLS + 
α4POLITICAL_CONTROLS + ε. 
where  
• SHARE denotes the share of regional government in the overall tax revenue of the region (re-
tention rate);  
• ARREARS denote the tax arrears; 
• TAX_STRUCTURE denotes the control variables associated with different tax structures in 
different regions; 
• LEGAL_CONTROLS denote the control variables due to the legal structure of the federal or-
ganization in Russia and 
• POLITICAL_CONTROLS denote the control variables due to political asymmetry of bargain-
ing power and of preferences in Russia. 
In what follows, we discuss the variables of the regression in greater detail. 
                                                          
5  One autonomous okrug (Chukotka) is not part of another member of the Federation; therefore Goskomstat pro-
vides statistical data for this region in full scale, and it could be included in our research. 
6   We are forced to exclude Kalmykia in 2006, since in this year it reported negative revenue of the federal govern-
ment from its territory (because of the VAT repayment). This is not the first time in the history of the Russian fe-
deralism a region reports negative tax collection: in the early 2000s Taimyr autonomous okrug (not part of the 
sample) reported negative fiscal revenue of the regional government due to tax optimization by Norilsli Nikel, its 
largest taxpayer. Moreover, for Kurgan and Tula in 2005 retention rates larger of 100% were obtained; the data 
seems to come from statistical artifacts of comparing information of different sources and hence were also ex-
cluded. 
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SHARE: This indicator is obtained by dividing the revenue of the regional government 
from taxation originating from a certain region by the overall tax revenue from its territory. We 
use the “consolidated” regional government including both government of the region and local 
governments.7 A higher share represents less centralization as defined above.8  
ARREARS: An advantage of the Russian dataset is that there are data available on tax ar-
rears for most of the regions and at least from 1995 onwards as reported by the federal statistical 
authority. The reported tax arrears in Russia include (1) tax obligations, which are claimed by the 
tax authorities, but were not paid by the taxpayer (nedoimka), (2) restructured tax liabilities (e.g. 
when the payment of taxes was officially delayed), (3) tax liabilities not collected in due time be-
cause of the bankruptcy of the taxpayer, (4) tax liabilities, currently under collection by the court 
executives (bailiffs) and (5) liabilities from stopped tax collection activities. This measure has 
certain advantages and disadvantages. For example, it can also be influenced by events like bank-
ruptcy of large taxpayers or “wrong” claims of tax authorities, which could be later suspended by 
the court. One should be aware that the measure is not an indicator of the shadow economy and 
therefore does not measure the overall economic activity, which is “ignored” (consciously or not) 
by the tax authorities and therefore does not represent the tax auditing activity. However, it seems 
to be a good proxy for tax collection activity as defined above.  
The problem is unfortunately that, on the one hand, increasing tax arrears may indicate 
less severe tax collection activities, but may on the other hand result from more intensive tax au-
diting. The reasons are straightforward: tax due identified by the tax collection authority is first 
registered as tax arrears and later (often after a decision of a court) “transformed” into real tax 
payments. The main question is therefore whether tax collection or tax auditing activity is really 
relevant for Russian federalism. The arguments above do not discriminate between these two 
processes. However, as already mentioned, in the liquidity crisis environment under Yeltsin it 
was the tax collection, and not the tax auditing issue, which dictated the fiscal process; under Pu-
tin tax collection remained a non-trivial activity and therefore still constituted a significant issue. 
Thus, our approach to the interpretation seems to be justified. Finally, in section 7 we deal with 
                                                          
7  Throughout the paper the consolidated regional budget comprises the overall budget of the region and all subor-
dinated jurisdictions (municipalities). Since Russian regions are highly centralized and municipalities depend on 
the regional governments in their essential tasks, this is a reasonable indicator to use. 
8  Since the variable is bounded between zero and one, it is sometimes suggested to perform a log-odds transforma-
tion (log (SHARE/(1-SHARE)) to obtain the independent variable. We have used it for robustness checks and did 
not find any significant differences in the results of the estimations. 
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alternative explanatory variables, which are, unfortunately, available only for a short time period, 
and also provide some tentative evidence in favor of our interpretation of tax arrears. 
Tax arrears used in the study accumulate for all taxes due to all levels of government of 
the Russian Federation (i.e. include both “regional” and “federal” taxes, as defined by the Rus-
sian tax law). The reason is the existence of joint taxation which in fact forms the main revenue 
source for regional governments. As already mentioned, any joint tax can be more or less attrac-
tive for regional governments (or for the federal centre) assuming different distribution of tax 
revenue: therefore the tax collection effort could vary. It is probably helpful to assume that dif-
ferent taxes are more or less attractive for different levels of government as opposed to each oth-
er rather than to use a dichotomy of “attractive” or “not attractive” forms of taxation. The indica-
tor used in regressions is therefore tax arrears per unit of gross regional product (the normaliza-
tion is needed to account for significant differences in terms of size of regions in Russia).9  We 
square this indicator in order to account for non-linearity in the relation between tax arrears and 
decentralization.10 Indeed, the strategic tax collection activity is non-trivial for tax authorities and 
associated with additional effort for organizing strategic tax collection. Since this effort at least 
partly has the character of fixed costs (or, at least, is decreasing with experience because of learn-
ing effects), it seems to be reasonable, that only if tax arrears become very large, the officials 
start really thinking about strategic tax collection; the increase of tax arrears over-proportionally 
increases the incentives to engage in this activity if high levels of tax arrears relative to the re-
gional economy are reached. For the panel data specifications we include two tax arrears indica-
tors: under Yeltsin and under Putin. Both are equal to tax arrears per unit of GRP for the periods 
of administration of the respective president and zero otherwise. So, we consider as an independ-
ent variable an interaction term between a time effect and tax arrears. 
TAX_STRUCTURE: We include two variables accounting for economic differences 
among the regions. By including controls we, first, capture other factors leading to asymmetries 
between regions in the tax split between the regional and the federal budget. Mostly, they cover 
economic asymmetries or differences in tax base endowments. Their major effect is that they in-
                                                          
9  A disadvantage of this proxy for tax collection effort is that we had to exclude nine Russian regions (the so-called 
“autonomous okrugs” which are officially both members of the federation and parts of other larger regions), for 
which GRP data are only available until 2000, for the aims of consistency of annual cross-sections. 
10  Estimations without squaring tax arrears yield almost the same results: the effect for Yeltsin survives and for Putin 
there are even more significant and negative outcomes (since Kalmykia becomes more influential). Specifications 
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fluence the ability of regions to collect different types of taxes. Under equal rules for distribution 
of tax revenue from a region, great disproportions in the structure of tax revenue effectively allow 
regional governments to have a different share in the tax revenue of their territory. We control for 
variables roughly representing two sources of taxation: the flow of economic activity (average in-
come per capita) and the stock of economic assets (capital funds).  
LEGAL_CONTROLS: Another group of controls represents formal factors leading to dif-
ferences in tax sharing. From this point of view we include a dummy variable for Tatarstan and 
Bashkortostan. As mentioned above, these two regions were the first to enter the direct bilateral 
bargaining with the federal centre in the early 1990s and to sign separate power-sharing agree-
ments, which allowed these republics to receive all excises and rental payments for the natural 
resources instead of the federal centre (Lavrov, 2005). Therefore it is reasonable to assume, that 
these two regions have a significantly different share of taxes attributed to their budgets. There 
are reasons to claim that the effect for these two territories differed substantially under Yeltsin 
and under Putin; hence, the regressions actually include two dummies: for these two republics in 
1995-1999 (Yeltsin) and 2000-2006 (Putin). 
POLITICAL_CONTROLS: Finally, we include control variables capturing political bar-
gaining power and preferences of the regional elite vis-à-vis the federal centre. Naturally, these 
factors are partly captured by the tax arrears structure. It has also been demonstrated by previous 
empirical studies cited above, that political bargaining power plays a role. However, even if the 
other regions apart from Tatarstan and Bashkortostan cannot directly influence the distribution of 
tax revenue, they still have an opportunity to bargain with the federal centre in order to set taxes 
split in a particular way, which favors particular jurisdictions given their endowment with a tax 
base. Therefore bargaining over policies regarding the whole federation becomes an instrument 
of selective support of different regions. There is some anecdotal evidence that strategically act-
ing governments influence the federal decisions on the distribution of overall taxes (for the whole 
Russian Federation) to their advantage (see Petkov and Shklyar, 1999). Also, preferences account 
for a desire of regional elites to invest more heavily in the bargaining process. From this point of 
view we estimate all regressions with and without political variables, in order to check the ro-
bustness of results (but only regressions with political variables are reported in the paper).  
                                                                                                                                                                                            
with linear and squared term are hard to justify theoretically, and, once performed, yield highly non-robust outcomes 
with mostly insignificant coefficients. 
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Political variables, generally speaking, include two main groups: differences in bargaining 
power and in political preferences. The following bargaining factors are considered: 
1. Economic potential of the region: territory, population and share of oil and gas extrac-
tion in the region (due to importance of these resources for Russia). The variables of economic 
potential (especially oil and gas share) represent both political bargaining power and differences 
in the structure of tax bases and therefore have a double role in our model. 
2. Formal status of the region. The formal structure of the federation was inherited from 
Soviet times and, unlike the absolute majority of federations with a unified regional unit, includes 
territorial units of three major types: republics, administrative units (oblast, federal city or krai11) 
and autonomous okrugs. National republics are often argued to enjoy special privileges as com-
pared to other units of the federation (Filippov and Shvetsova, 1999); that is why we include a 
dummy for republics in our regressions.  
3. The ability of the region to secede (which is higher for border regions, for regions with 
higher distance from the capital and for regions with lower share of ethnically Russians). We in-
clude two variables to capture this effect: a dummy for border regions and the geographical dis-
tance between regional capitals and Moscow. 
4. Over- (or under-)representation of the region in the lower chamber of the Russian par-
liament. Since 1993 the Russian parliament consists of two chambers: the Council of Federation, 
which includes one representative of the region’s legislature and one representative of the re-
gion’s governor administration, and the State Duma, which consists of 450 deputies, 225 elected 
by a system of proportional representation and 225 elected in single member districts. The mal-
apportionment in the State Duma is of greater interest, since the mal-apportionment in the Coun-
cil of Federation is basically covered by the population variable among the controls (for influence 
of mal-apportionment on political decisions see Samuels and Snyder, 2001). 
5. Power concentration within the office of the regional governor or president and conflict 
potential with the centre. The most common way to measure power is to discuss electoral statis-
tics (share of governor in the latest elections or years in office). The conflict potential with the 
centre is often measured by the partisan status of the governor (e.g. Communist governors in the 
1990s or support of pro-presidential parties Our House Russia, Unity and Unified Russia in the 
elections of 1995, 1999 and 2003). Other indicators and expert opinion could be applied. They all 
                                                          
11  Yevreiskaia autonomous oblast has a similar status, although formally belongs to national units of the Federation. 
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are questionable to a certain extent: In Russia, cheating and administrative manipulation of elec-
tions make their results less meaningful for analysis. The Communist governors used to establish 
excellent contacts with the centre after their elections and expert opinion is always subjective. 
Nevertheless, in this paper we reduce the variety of possible indicators to the power index of Ja-
rocinska (2004), partly including other indicators discussed above.12  
6. Dependence upon federal transfers. High centralization of tax revenue resulted in a rel-
atively high dependence of many regions from the central transfers to fulfill even their basic re-
sponsibilities. Once again, there is a de jure dimension of federal grants (which officially fol-
lowed a predetermined scheme) and de facto dimension (for example, political reasoning behind 
the grants distribution). The transfers are likely to influence both the size of tax arrears (since 
they act, to a certain extent, as a substitute for regions’ own tax revenue) and the degree of decen-
tralization (through the regions’ bargaining position over general rules of tax collection); hence, 
in order to avoid the omitted common cause problem, we have to control for the impact of trans-
fers. The issue of transfers is interesting, as it represents a trade-off for the regions: to pay more 
taxes and (probably) to receive higher compensation in form of transfers or to pay little taxes and 
loose a claim for financial support from the centre. In a real world setting with asymmetric in-
formation it is possible that a region uses both strategies or switches from one strategy to another. 
Regions with a relatively high bargaining power can succeed in both strategies. We include the 
share of fiscal transfers in total expenditures of regional governments to account for this effect. 
Obviously, the timing of events should represent an important feature from this point of view: if 
transfers are distributed before tax collection effort is made, there should be no effect on tax col-
lection. However, from the empirical point of view this issue seems to be relatively intransparent. 
Governments collect taxes throughout the year (partly on quarterly basis), and hence, there is no 
clear “timing” vis-à-vis transfer decisions. Moreover, the relations between regional and federal 
governments could be analyzed as a repeated game for which expectations should play an impor-
tant role.13  
                                                          
12 The index is calculated for 1995-2000; there is no information after 2000 available. Since there have been a num-
ber of significant political changes in Russia after this period, we include, once again, two variables: Power (1995-
2000) is equal to the actual variable in these years and zero otherwise; Power (2001-2006)  is equal to the power in-
dex in 2000 for the years 2001-2006 and zero otherwise. The interpretation of the respective coefficients, even if 
they are similar, ought to be different: the latter rather reflects the path-dependent effect of power asymmetries in the 
1990s persistent even after Putin’s recentralization. 
13  One should finally notice that a yet additional parameter of the fiscal system able to influence the logic of our 
study is public debt. From the point of view of public debt, Russian regions and municipalities received loans and 
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The simplest way to measure the heterogeneity in political preferences is to consider the 
ethnic composition of a region (share of non-Russian population) as well as other socio-demo-
graphic indicators. In this study we included the urbanization indicator, which proved to be sig-
nificant in other empirical papers on endogenous centralization.14 Moreover, there are significant 
differences in the democratization levels of different Russian regions which also account for het-
erogeneity of preferences (but also for peculiarities of regional political process). We use the Car-
negie Endowment index of democratization, which covers all regions in our analysis and varies 
over time. Some bargaining indicators (like average income per capita) also may be considered as 
a proxy for heterogeneous preferences. A detailed description of all variables and the summary 
statistics are provided in Appendix A. 
 
5. Econometric strategy 
As mentioned above, economic and political asymmetry of Russian federalism and the 
transition from Yeltsin to Putin during the period of observation create a series of econometric 
problems. Therefore we use a four-stage research strategy.  
First, in order to get a general “impression” on the specifics of the data, we estimate indi-
vidual annual cross section regressions by OLS. An advantage of the Russian Federation is that 
the high number of regions renders this approach statistically feasible. Already at this stage, as 
well as in the case of panel data regressions, we perform a simple outlier control as an additional 
robustness analysis ensuring normal distribution of residuals in order to make correct inference in 
a still small sample. Yet we do not take annual cross-sections as the main source of inference in 
our analysis; therefore the results are reported only in the appendix.   
Second, we address the problem of unobserved heterogeneity (both region-specific and ti-
me-specific) and run panel-data regressions with Newey-West corrected standard errors. We es-
                                                                                                                                                                                            
issued bonds of different types (Danielyants and Potanina, 2007); moreover, in the 1990s it has been common 
practice for governments in Russia to delay wages and salaries for public employees and officials, as well as oth-
er payments indefinitely. Tax arrears partly include delayed tax payments; that is why public debt decisions can 
be (voluntarily or involuntarily) determined by the problems of tax administration. However, this relation does 
not pose any problem for our empirical analysis given the aim of this paper. Another direction of causality (pub-
lic debt influences the quality of tax administration) is less reasonable: it is hardly possible to imagine a govern-
ment relying on debt if tax revenue is available (even if one ignores all budgetary principles, it is illogical, since 
tax revenue is “cheaper”). There is still one aspect of the debt problems which is relevant: if the payments to tax 
administrations are delayed, it will influence the quality of their work. However, there is no data available to 
measure these delays for individual regional tax administrations over the period of our sample. 
14  Although this indicator may also represent a higher bargaining power of metropolitan areas. 
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timate pooled cross-sections-time series models as well as one way and two way fixed effects re-
gressions (time and cross-section). Regional fixed effects are helpful, as they account for unob-
served heterogeneity among regions, which seems to be very strong given the extremely asym-
metric spatial structure of the Russian economy and the political constitution of Russian federal-
ism; pooled cross-sections and one way time fixed effects allow the direct inclusion of institu-
tional variables (which often do not vary across time) into our model. Pooled OLS includes a 
dummy for all years when Vladimir Putin was in office, so that one can directly observe the 
changes induced by the transition of power. Under Putin the development of tax arrears and the 
distribution of tax revenue may be driven not only by strategic tax collection, but also by tax re-
form described above. One can consider it an omitted variables problem: the increase of both tax 
arrears and the share of taxes attributed to the federal centre are driven by a third variable (tax 
reform and intensification of overall tax collection activity). Time FE and the Putin dummy are 
instrumental to cope with this problem.  
In order to form separate variables for the Yeltsin and Putin tax arrears (as considered 
above) and the dummy variable for Putin’s presidency we count the year 2000 as the first year 
when Putin was already in office. Indeed, Putin became acting president on December 31, 1999. 
The first shift in the structure of federalism was in May 2000, as the president appointed his rep-
resentatives to the newly established “federal districts” in order to control local governors. More-
over, the year 2000 was associated with a rapid change of informal rules of the game; combined 
with expectations of further centralization by regional officials, one could expect the changes in 
strategic tax collection behavior already in 2000. However, since Putin’s rise to power was ex-
tremely quick and completely unexpected for both population and local elites (in fact, in 1999 
most influential governors counted on the alternative candidate, former prime minister Yevgeniy 
Primakov), one should not expect any changes in tax collection due to shifts in expectations in 
1999, and hence, it is reasonable to attribute this year to the “Yeltsin period”. 
Third, as mentioned above, the asymmetric character of Russian federalism is likely to 
cause problems of outliers. In particular, this outcome seems to be plausible for the Putin period, 
since the standard deviation of both fiscal decentralization indicator (Figure 4 above) and tax ar-
rears (Figure 5) increased significantly. The latter trend can be attributed to increases of tax ar-
rears in a small group of regions, particularly in Kalmykia, where tax arrears exceeded the size of 
its GRP or were nearly equal to it. Kalmykia did not show up as outlier in the previous analysis 
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based on large error terms; however, an extreme size of the variable for this observation can still 
influence the outcomes of the analysis. The reduction of standard deviation in 2006 is due to the 
already discussed exclusion of Kalmykia from the sample. 
0
.0
5
.1
.1
5
.2
.2
5
m
ea
n/
m
ed
ia
n/
sd
1995 2000 2005
year
mean median
sd
 
Figure 5: Statistics for tax arrears per unit of GRP for the regions in the sample of this 
paper 
Source: Goskomstat 
Generally speaking, the situation in Kalmykia confirms the explanation presented above. During 
the 1990s this region functioned as a kind of “internal tax haven”: extremely loyal policies of the 
local tax authorities combined with the reduction of a region’s share in tax rates and privileged 
treatment of companies with the majority of operations outside the region made it attractive for a 
huge variety of firms, including several large oil giants, which used Kalmykia for their transfer 
pricing design. On the other hand, the region had one of the strongest authoritarian regimes in 
post-Soviet Russia even compatible to that of post-Soviet Central Asian republics (see Gel’man, 
1999). The government of the Republic dominated its economic structure. Kalmykia used to be 
not only one of the strongest, but also one of the most eccentric regimes, often directly opposing 
the federal government or declaring its region an “independent state” within the Russian Federa-
tion. That is why after Putin’s rise to power Kalmykian president Iliumdzinov had to have more 
fears than his counterparts in other Russian regions. Kalmykia was also partly subject to busi-
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ness-government struggles of the mid-2000s, associated with tax auditing of the largest Russian 
oil companies like Yukos or Sibneft, previously using the Kalmykian offshore. The problem of 
outliers requires careful econometric modeling. 
The previous steps already included outlier control based on tests on normality of residu-
als. In the third stage, however, we explicitly address this issue using two main instruments. First, 
we estimate least absolute deviation (median) regressions with bootstrapped standard errors, 
which are known to be more robust to samples with significant outliers. Second, we repeat all 
estimations performed in the steps one through three excluding observations with very large val-
ues of tax arrears and with known atypical tax policies. In particular, we exclude three regions: 
Kalmykia, as well as Ingushetia and Altai Republic. Both latter regions are well-known for using 
the described “tax haven strategy” based on the special status obtained (unlike most other tax ha-
vens) through presidential decrees to create a more favorable tax regime for companies incorpo-
rated in this jurisdictions (partly only for specific large taxpayers associated with influential mul-
tiregional business groups or privileged companies owned by the representatives of the regional 
elite). We have experimented with excluding further tax havens (Mordovia), but the results do 
not change; in fact, virtually all results are obtained immediately after excluding Kalmykia. These 
estimations for a reduced sample often differ substantially from the estimations for full sample.  
The need to exclude outliers even in a region fixed effects specification is supported by 
highly significant Chow test: for both two-way FE and region FE the joint significance test for 
the variables additionally included in the regression and constructed by interacting all covariates 
with a dummy for these three regions (but excluding the fixed effect itself) is significant at any 
reasonable level (and equal to 21.44 and 40.97 respectively). Hence, the effect of these three out-
liers is not captured completely by the intercept changes (implied by region fixed effects); there 
seems to be a strong effect on the slope. 
Fourth, we address the potential endogeneity bias due to a reverse causality problem (fis-
cal decentralization may influence tax collection behavior). There are theoretical reasons which 
make reverse causality questionable though. It is not clear whether the bargaining and economic 
power of the region depend upon the tax distribution or (as it is assumed by the empirical model) 
vice versa. Theoretically, there are some reasons to believe that this problem is less relevant for 
Russia. First, economic policies of Russian regions have been mostly inefficient, and their eco-
nomic success is mostly limited to agglomeration effects or natural resources. Ahrend (2005) 
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finds significant effects of fiscal policy on economic performance which, however, vanish in his 
TSLS regressions. There is some evidence from principal component analysis that fiscal policy 
can be important for regional economic development reported by Mau and Yanovsky (2002). 
However, Kolomak (2007) finds that investors are less sensitive to the size or duration of tax ex-
emptions, when implemented, than to the very existence of the investment law, and that the sub-
federal tax exemptions are unable to block an unfavorable industrial specialization and low de-
velopment of infrastructure.  
Second, since our paper deals with asymmetric distribution of tax revenue and not with 
differences in overall tax revenue, even effective tax policy does not necessarily lead to biased 
results. There is no consistent point of view in theory as to whether the federal centre or the re-
gions carry out more efficient economic policies; and in Russia with its huge regional variety 
both variants could be present. Therefore it is difficult to establish a clear backward causal link 
between tax distribution and economic asymmetry. Nevertheless, Desai et al. (2005) show, that 
there is a positive relation between some specific indicators of economic performance of the re-
gions and the retention of taxes.  
Finally, endogeneity may arise if regions increase their tax administration effort only if 
they are provided sufficient fiscal incentives in form of high retention rates (see Weingast, 2007). 
However, first, this logic is more applicable for tax auditing rather than for tax collection. Sec-
ond, one should understand, that in Russia retention rates represent outcomes of interaction rather 
than rules of the game (which, as mentioned, require equal treatment of all regions). In fact, one 
can be certain that the decision-makers in regional governments and tax collection authorities 
simply do not know the retention rates (these values are never reported and were calculated in a 
number of English-language publications obviously seldom consulted for regional governors). 
What they do observe (and manipulate) is their overall fiscal revenue; decentralization is just an 
ex-post result of the strategic tax collection and not its goal.    
Nevertheless, in order to check for robustness of our results to potential endogeneity we 
use two procedures. First, we estimate all regressions with lagged variables (i.e distribution of tax 
revenue in year t is explained by variables of the year t-1). These estimations are helpful as tax 
collection of the current year is partly calculated on the basis of past year’s revenues, which can 
be captured by our additional analysis. However, according to our understanding of Russian fis-
cal system, taxes are usually collected throughout the year rather than next year (even for income 
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tax collected by tax agents). Hence, in a rapidly changing environment this specification may se-
riously miss true interaction of political and economic variables.  
The second approach is based on the instrumental variables estimator. We use retail sales 
and net profits as instruments for both tax arrears under Putin and under Yeltsin. Indeed, these 
variables may indicate the performance of local enterprises, important for tax arrears formation. 
As these variables prove to be largely insignificant in the panel and cross section OLS regressions 
and as there are theoretical arguments that these variables influence tax arrears, they may serve as 
(weak) instruments when no other, more suggestive instruments are available. Using additional 
instruments suggested by Treisman’s (2003) specification (share of agriculture and share of do-
minant enterprises) those turn out to be much weaker as instruments. In particular, the Hansen J 
test statistics largely indicate over-identification. Unfortunately the quality of instruments is 
much better for the Yeltsin than for the Putin tax arrears. 
 
6. Results  
6.1. Strategic tax collection 
              The results of the four-stage strategy are reported in Tables 1-4 for panel data and in Ap-
pendix B for annual cross-sections. Panel data analysis (OLS) and annual cross-sections yield dif-
ferent results. In annual cross-sections we do not find any significant impact of the tax manipula-
tion in the Russian Federation on the decentralization until 2000. Since 2000 we find strongly 
significant evidence of influence of tax arrears on the distribution of taxes, and the sign of the 
coefficient is negative in each cross-section, consistent with Hypothesis 2. However, the pooled 
cross-sections (both with and without year dummies or Putin dummy) indicate a non-significant 
(although negative) sign of tax arrears under Putin. This might indicate an existence of a time 
trend in some other variables correlated with the tax arrears and hence creating multicollinearity 
problem and calls to caution in interpreting the results. Tax arrears for the Yeltsin period have the 
positive sign predicted by Hypothesis 1, but are, however, mostly insignificant. 
The Jarque-Bera test for all panel data and annual cross-section regressions is significant, 
such that the hypothesis of normal distribution of residuals must be rejected. This requires us to 
test on the robustness of the regression results to outliers. While the estimations for Putin period 
are mostly robust to this procedure, tax arrears for the Yeltsin period hold their sign after the ex-
clusion of outliers and even become significant in all panel data specifications (Appendix B, Ta-
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ble B2; Appendix C, Table C1). Hence, provided the outliers are excluded, both hypotheses find 
some support. In order to check the robustness of the results we exclude all political variables 
(given their relatively “vague” nature, causing the threat of measurement errors) and control the 
restricted regressions for the normality of residuals. Generally, this analysis does not change our 
results (Appendix C, Table C2) and even yield significant negative coefficients for Putin tax ar-
rears in pooled OLS (indicating that our suggestion of possible multicollinearity might be right). 
A further robustness check is to estimate regressions for Yeltsin and Putin periods independently 
(i.e. assuming that slopes of coefficients and intercepts are different for the two regimes). We 
find no significant influences of tax arrears for the Yeltsin period (with an unstable and only part-
ly theory-consistent sign, see Appendix D, Table D1) and non-robust impact of Putin tax arrears 
(see Appendix D, Table D3). 
 As already mentioned, however, the estimation results seem to be heavily influenced by 
outliers. The results of the outlier-robust median regressions are striking: we find support for Hy-
pothesis 1 – a positive and significant impact of Yeltsin tax arrears on the retention rates – in al-
most all specifications for the full sample (Tables 1-4), and also for most specifications in estima-
tions for Yeltsin period (Appendix D, Table D3). Putin tax arrears are insignificant and non-
robust in terms of sign (Tables 1-4 and Appendix D, Table D4). Moreover, after excluding three 
outliers with abnormal fiscal policies and/ or extraordinarily large tax arrears – Kalmykia, In-
gushetia and Altai Republic – we find convincing support for Hypothesis 1 regardless of the 
specification, estimation method and sample (all years or only for the Yeltsin period). The results 
for Putin tax arrears are not robust in terms of sign and mostly insignificant. Hence, we find 
strong evidence that, controlling for outliers, regional governments under Yeltsin were able to 
manipulate tax arrears in a way leading to de-facto fiscal decentralization. The results for Putin 
period, if present, are driven by several outliers and are not robust to the model specification.  
 Finally, we use several approaches to account for a potential endogeneity problem. The 
lagged variables specification basically does not support Hypothesis 1: Yeltsin tax arrears are 
mostly non-robust. The same is true for Hypothesis 2. We caution however, that, as already no-
ticed, given the institutional design of the Russian fiscal federalism the lagged approach is not the 
most reliable one, and hence, consider the results of these regressions as less convincing. Table 4 
reports TSLS estimations for two-way fixed effects specification. For both specifications with 
and without outliers we once again find significant and positive impact of Yeltsin tax arrears on 
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the retention rates. Since the instruments for Putin tax arrears are very weak, we also perform the 
TSLS estimation skipping this variable, and the results do not change (yielding significance at 
5% level in full sample and at 1% level excluding three outliers). Finally, fiscal transfers, being 
used as one of the control variables, are clearly endogenous. Hence, we have also estimated all 
specifications and models without fiscal transfers and, once again, did not find any significant 
differences. 
 
6.2. Determinants of retention rates 
Although our main aim is to test the strategic tax collection hypothesis in the Russian 
sample, our results may also be instructive in terms of the analysis of factors driving the differen-
tiation of retention rates in Russian regions and thus contribute to the understanding of positive 
determinants of fiscal decentralization. The results of the panel data analysis partly follow the 
predicted pattern: higher bargaining potential and/or higher heterogeneity as compared to the 
Russian average lead to higher decentralization. As expected, the dummy for Tatarstan and Bash-
kortostan for the Yeltsin period has a positive sign and is significant in all specifications. In the 
annual cross-sections we find that the republics of Tatarstan and Bashkortostan have a signifi-
cantly lower share of taxes attributed to the centre than the rest of the members of the Federation 
until 2000 (when the centralization effort of Vladimir Putin started). They seem to have lost their 
significant impact on tax collection even before the formal abolition of power sharing treaties in 
2002. Even more, for 2004 we find a negative and significant effect: it looks like the Putin’s gov-
ernment specifically focused on reducing the fiscal autonomy of these two regions. Similarly, it is 
significant in the Yeltsin regressions in Appendix D, but insignificant in the Putin regressions es-
timated by OLS and negative and significant for some median specifications. In the panel data 
estimation the dummy republic is significant and has a positive sign in the majority of regres-
sions, representing a higher bargaining power of republics and/or path dependency effects. The 
dummy for border regions is also almost always significant and positive, indicating higher bar-
gaining power of potential secessionist territories (or relative underdevelopment of the region re-
quiring special treatment). Territory is highly significant and positive, supporting the idea, that 
territory was used as a bargaining argument in Russia. The effects of population are partly sig-
nificant, but the sign varies from specification to specification; it is negative without region fixed 
effects and positive and significant with region fixed effects. The latter sign seems also to be 
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more in line with the hypotheses, while the former might come from the effects of interaction be-
tween territory and population. 
However, we do not find any robust influence of the indices of power and democracy on 
tax distribution (the result is sensitive to the specification of the model because of multicollinear-
ity problems, inevitable for an artificially constructed index).15 It is possible to interpret this re-
sult as indicating a very low transparency of tax relations between the Russian regions and the 
federal centre. A surprising result is, that regions with a higher share of Russian population were 
associated with a higher share of taxes remaining in the region (as already noted, this effect was 
probably achieved through the significance and the sign of the coefficient in the early 2000s). To 
a certain extent it contradicts the common wisdom that the national republics were more 
secessionist and interested in decentralization than Russian regions. Indeed, the dummy republic 
already captured potential secessionist tensions. Nevertheless, the result is still unexpected. 
There are several explanations for this. First, regions may be more interested in federal 
transfers than in taxes. It is true for both more powerful regions (which gain from redistribution 
on the federal level) and heterogeneous poor regions with large populations. Indeed, the model 
contains a significant positive effect of fiscal transfers on tax distribution in favor of regions, 
which does not hold after excluding outliers. Second, the treatment of the city of Moscow with a 
relatively low share of tax revenue attributed to its government and excellent indicators may in-
fluence the regressions. However, Moscow is not an outlier (from the point of view of residuals), 
and so should not influence the robustness of regressions. Third, it is possible, that higher power 
and higher heterogeneity cause an opposite effect: the federal government is even more likely to 
put pressure on these regions. For example, a possible interpretation of the results is that the cen-
tralization pressure from the centre in the early 2000s was higher for national than for Russian re-
gions (as the latter were perceived as a larger threat for the unity of Russia). The federal centre 
seems to be more active in suppressing wealthy regions than poor territories still depending on 
tax transfers. This policy could include both, specific measures for individual territories or a gen-
eral design of the tax system. In fact, in the annual cross-sections the share of Russians also has a 
                                                          
15 Power variable is in fact partly negative and significant, and the results seems to appear more often for the 2001-
2006 then for the 1995-2000 variable; hence, shadow of the past, as in case of Tatarstan and Bashkortostan, may 
support central government’s desire to reduce the retention rates for formerly powerful agents (or reflect higher sta-
bility of power relations than often perceived). 
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positive sign; the significant results concentrate in the 2000s (yet separate regressions in Appen-
dix D discussed below show that the variable is significant for both Yeltsin and Putin periods). 
 The dummy for Putin’s office period is highly significant and negative for all models in 
which it is included: it shows once again the centralization trend in Russian federalism under Pu-
tin. Moreover, controlling for time series fixed effects or the Putin dummy does not change the 
results suggesting that the omitted variables problem due to the Putin tax reform does not affect 
our regressions. The tax structure variables were mostly unstable or even insignificant, thus sup-
porting the extremely high importance of political factors for tax assignment, which seems to be 
present in the 2000s. However, a surprising result is that separate regressions for Yeltsin and Pu-
tin periods yield basically the same determinants of retention rates (with the exception of legal 
status dummy for Tatarstan and Bashkortostan). It may indicate that we need to re-evaluate the 
common perception of crucial changes in the regions-federation nexus under Putin vis-à-vis the 
Yeltsin period. Under Putin fiscal transfers and democracy seem to play a more important role. 
The former have positive sign (indicating that the same regions receive higher portion of federal 
grants and enjoy higher retention rates), but is, as mentioned, virtually impossible to interpret due 
to the endogeneity. The democracy variable is significant and negative in median regressions, but 
not significant in OLS. 
While for the panel data the set of outliers could be hardly interpreted, the changes in the 
group of outliers throughout annual cross-sections (Appendix B, Table B2) allow for some inter-
esting conclusions. The number of outliers increased in the late 1990s-early 2000 and then went 
down again; it is the highest in 1998 (the year of the Russian financial crisis) and 2001 (when Pu-
tin’s reforms were in discussion). This indicates an unstable situation in the Russian Federation in 
the “transition period” from Yeltsin to Putin, when regions partly carried out “atypical” economic 
policies, which cannot be captured by our modeling. Most outliers did not fit the general pattern 
for the Russian Federation exactly in these years when these regions were more active in carrying 
out the already mentioned “tax haven strategy” (Ingushetia in the early 1990s, Mordovia in the 
early 2000s, Altai Republic throughout the period), i.e. used legal possibilities provided by the 
presidential decrees or loopholes in the legislation to create a more favorable tax regime for com-
panies incorporated in this jurisdictions (partly only for specific large taxpayers associated with 
influential multiregional business groups or privileged companies owned by the representatives 
of the regional elite). Unfortunately, absence of transparent and consequent information makes an 
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ex ante control for this strategy in empirical research practically impossible. The outliers after 
2004 on are less easy to interpret, since the internal tax havens were abolished. 
  
Table 1: Panel data regressions (no fixed effects), 1995-2006, dep. var.: retention rate  
 (1) 
OLS 
(2) 
OLS 
(3) 
Median 
(4) 
Median 
(5) 
OLS 
(6) 
OLS 
(7) 
Median 
(8) 
Median 
-0.048 -0.045 -0.038 -0.036 -0.417 -0.079 -1.702 -0.520 Tax arrears squared  
(Putin) (0.032) (0.031) (0.298) (0.290) (0.594) (0.449) (1.450) (1.090) 
1.391 0.361 1.952*** 1.232** 2.501*** 1.665*** 2.174*** 1.305** Tax arrears squared 
(Yeltsin) (0.998) (1.056) (0.541) (0.550) (0.486) (0.480) (0.558) (0.545) 
Dummy Putin  -0.075***  -0.079***  -0.061***  -0.073*** 
  (0.017)  (0.012)  (0.014)  (0.016) 
Tax structure 
0.014*** 0.015*** 0.019*** 0.021*** 0.013*** 0.014*** 0.019*** 0.024*** Average income per 
capita (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
-0.069*** -0.073*** -0.082*** -0.094*** -0.052** -0.055*** -0.076*** -0.103*** Capital funds 
(0.019) (0.020) (0.023) (0.024) (0.021) (0.021) (0.026) (0.027) 
Legal factors 
-0.003 0.009 -0.037 -0.025 -0.026 -0.017 -0.061 -0.037 Dummy Tatarstan and 
Bashkortostan (Putin) (0.044) (0.047) (0.035) (0.040) (0.043) (0.046) (0.039) (0.040) 
0.230*** 0.236*** 0.178*** 0.180*** 0.186*** 0.191*** 0.143*** 0.172*** Dummy Tatarstan and 
Bashkortostan (Yeltsin) (0.033) (0.032) (0.036) (0.035) (0.031) (0.030) (0.037) (0.035) 
Political variables 
0.036*** 0.036*** 0.023* 0.026** 0.020* 0.020* 0.007 0.017 Territory 
(0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) 
-0.004 -0.004 -0.006 -0.005 -0.007 -0.007 -0.006 -0.005 Population 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
-0.028 -0.02 -0.053 -0.015 -0.056 -0.050 -0.017 0.010 Oil & gas share 
(0.057) (0.056) (0.066) (0.071) (0.062) (0.061) (0.076) (0.075) 
0.027** 0.026** 0.027*** 0.028*** 0.014 0.013 0.015* 0.019** Dummy border region 
(0.011) (0.011) (0.009) (0.008) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.008) 
0.007*** 0.007*** 0.005*** 0.005** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.005*** Distance from Moscow 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
0.076*** 0.075** 0.064** 0.061*** 0.079*** 0.078*** 0.081*** 0.072*** Dummy republic 
(0.029) (0.029) (0.025) (0.022) (0.027) (0.027) (0.023) (0.023) 
-0.013 -0.014 -0.008 -0.006 -0.007 -0.008 0.001 -0.001 Overrepresentation in 
State Duma (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) 
-0.029*** -0.025*** -0.017** -0.011 -0.022** -0.019** -0.013* -0.005 Power (2001-2006) 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007) 
-0.021** -0.024*** -0.006 -0.008 -0.014 -0.016* -0.004 -0.001 Power (1995-2000) 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007) 
0.128** 0.143*** 0.051 0.094** 0.085** 0.099** 0.008 0.083* Fiscal transfers 
(0.052) (0.051) (0.046) (0.045) (0.04) (0.039) (0.045) (0.045) 
-0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.002** -0.001 Democratization 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
0.191*** 0.192*** 0.135*** 0.152*** 0.161*** 0.162*** 0.142*** 0.150*** Share of Russians 
(0.065) (0.064) (0.052) (0.045) (0.048) (0.047) (0.044) (0.040) 
1.755** 1.802** 0.322 0.246 -0.392 -0.355 -0.715 -0.614 Urbanization 
(0.728) (0.709) (0.557) (0.459) (0.586) (0.570) (0.502) (0.472) 
Constant 0.459*** 0.488*** 0.525*** 0.526*** 0.586*** 0.608*** 0.598*** 0.541*** 
 (0.105) (0.103) (0.083) (0.076) (0.081) (0.080) (0.076) (0.069) 
Outliers included Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No 
No. obs. 945 945 945 945 910 910 910 910 
R2 0.493 0.263   0.267 0.530   
Pseudo R2   0.165 0.183   0.190 0.205 
F-test 21.49*** 20.76***   19.72*** 19.92***   
Jarque Bera 234.7*** 235.3***   390.0*** 429.0***   
Notes: Numbers in parenthesis are robust Newey/West standard errors for first-order autocorrelation (for OLS) and 
Bootstrapped standard errors (bootstrapts n = 1000) for median regressions; ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 
5, 10 % levels respectively. Significant results are marked bold. 
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Table 2: Panel data regressions (time fixed effects), 1995-2006, dep. var.: retention rate  
 (10) 
OLS 
(11) 
Median 
(12) 
OLS 
(13) 
Median 
-0.063** -0.061 0.054 -0.135 Tax arrears squared  
(Putin) (0.026) (0.138) (0.319) (0.558) 
-0.290 1.026 1.080* 1.267* Tax arrears squared 
(Yeltsin) (1.115) (0.748) (0.579) (0.726) 
Tax structure     
-0.006 -0.002 -0.004 -0.003 Average income per 
capita (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
-0.026 -0.044 -0.015 -0.034 Capital funds 
(0.024) (0.037) (0.025) (0.037) 
Legal factors     
-0.006 -0.056 -0.025 -0.062 Dummy Tatarstan and 
Bashkortostan (Putin) (0.055) (0.054) (0.053) (0.055) 
0.221*** 0.182*** 0.182*** 0.156*** Dummy Tatarstan and 
Bashkortostan (Yeltsin) (0.033) (0.035) (0.029) (0.035) 
Political variables     
0.048*** 0.029*** 0.032*** 0.017* Territory 
(0.010) (0.011) (0.009) (0.010) 
-0.003 0.001 -0.005 -0.003 Population 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) 
-0.062 0.023 -0.088 0.036 Oil & gas share 
(0.064) (0.094) (0.066) (0.108) 
0.027*** 0.023*** 0.015 0.015** Dummy border region 
(0.010) (0.007) (0.009) (0.007) 
0.008*** 0.007*** 0.008*** 0.008*** Distance from Moscow 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
0.085*** 0.087*** 0.084*** 0.091*** Dummy republic 
(0.027) (0.019) (0.025) (0.019) 
-0.002 0.005 0.001 0.008* Overrepresentation in 
State Duma (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.005) 
-0.031*** -0.018* -0.028** -0.010 Power (2001-2006) 
(0.012) (0.010) (0.012) (0.010) 
-0.013* -0.008 -0.003 -0.001 Power (1995-2000) 
(0.008) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) 
0.163*** 0.123*** 0.131*** 0.080** Fiscal transfers 
(0.052) (0.035) (0.041) (0.034) 
-0.001 -0.002** -0.001 -0.002* Democratization 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
0.197*** 0.178*** 0.164*** 0.176*** Share of Russians 
(0.059) (0.039) (0.043) (0.036) 
2.972*** 1.357*** 0.762 0.193 Urbanization 
(0.704) (0.460) (0.568) (0.450) 
Constant 0.536*** 0.603*** 0.666*** 0.636*** 
 (0.121) (0.092) (0.100) (0.087) 
Outliers included Yes Yes No No 
No. obs. 945 945 910 910 
R2 0.468  0.414  
Pseudo R2  0.287  0.312 
F-test 19.46***  24.84***  
Jarque Bera 396.0***  916.3***  
Notes: see table 1. Coefficients for time and region FE are not reported. Some controls are dropped due to time in-
variance. 
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Table 3: Panel data regressions (region fixed effects), 1995-2006, dep. var.: retention rate  
 (14) 
OLS 
(15) 
Median 
(16) 
OLS 
(17) 
Median 
0.041 0.041 -0.370 -1.073 Tax arrears squared  
(Putin) (0.028) (0.250) (0.446) (1.502) 
3.705*** 4.578*** 4.131*** 4.460*** Tax arrears squared 
(Yeltsin) (0.760) (0.831) (0.735) (0.998) 
Tax structure     
0.012*** 0.017*** 0.012*** 0.017*** Average income per 
capita (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
-0.086*** -0.123*** -0.073*** -0.121*** Capital funds 
(0.021) (0.030) (0.021) (0.035) 
Political variables     
0.094*** 0.106** 0.056* 0.062 Population 
(0.036) (0.046) (0.032) (0.047) 
4.204 5.907 1.401 4.686 Oil & gas share 
(4.840) (7.801) (4.666) (7.218) 
-0.018 -0.011 -0.014 0.006 Overrepresentation in 
State Duma (0.016) (0.024) (0.014) (0.019) 
-0.069 -0.167*** -0.231*** -0.243*** Fiscal transfers 
(0.069) (0.059) (0.051) (0.055) 
-0.006*** -0.008*** -0.006** -0.007*** Democratization 
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
0.432 4.288 4.959 7.861* Urbanization 
(4.155) (4.702) (3.846) (4.419) 
Constant 0.742** -0.626 -0.337 -0.619 
 (0.327) (0.620) (0.297) (0.605) 
Outliers included Yes Yes No No 
No. obs. 945 945 910 910 
Pseudo R2  0.332  0.338 
F-test 11.27***  12.62***  
Jarque Bera 240.5***  236.9***  
Notes: see table 1. Coefficients for time and region FE are not reported. Some controls are dropped due to time in-
variance in region fixed effects specification. 
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Table 4: Panel data regressions (two-way fixed effects), 1995-2006, dep. var.: retention rate  
 
 (18) 
OLS 
(19) 
Median 
(20) 
TSLS 
(21) 
OLS 
(22) 
Median 
(23) 
TSLS 
0.015 0.028 -0.172 0.289 -0.049 -10.529 Tax arrears squared  
(Putin) (0.020) (0.087) (0.875) (0.255) (0.529) (16.172) 
1.028 1.666** 53.811* 1.677* 1.666** 48.676** Tax arrears squared 
(Yeltsin) (0.803) (0.739) (31.48) (0.862) (0.784) (20.087) 
Tax structure 
-0.007 -0.001 0.028* -0.004 -0.000 0.036* Average income per 
capita (0.005) (0.005) (0.017) (0.005) (0.005) (0.019) 
-0.060*** -0.067* -0.072** -0.056** -0.072* -0.054 Capital funds 
(0.022) (0.037) (0.036) (0.023) (0.038) (0.044) 
Political variables 
0.153*** 0.097** -0.163 0.113*** 0.097** -0.240 Population 
(0.040) (0.041) (0.180) (0.034) (0.042) (0.210) 
7.341 5.285 -13.994 4.723 5.047 -12.575 Oil & gas share 
(5.091) (8.386) (16.909) (4.902) (8.525) (9.577) 
-0.008 0.005 0.046 -0.007 0.005 0.049 Overrepresentation in 
State Duma (0.012) (0.016) (0.037) (0.011) (0.015) (0.034) 
-0.008 0.005 0.046 -0.007 0.005 0.049 Fiscal transfers 
(0.012) (0.016) (0.037) (0.011) (0.015) (0.034) 
-0.000 -0.000 0.012 -0.001 -0.000 0.002 Democratization 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.018) (0.002) (0.002) (0.007) 
0.033 2.473 8.03 3.451 5.341 5.211 Urbanization 
(4.102) (3.720) (23.884) (3.940) (3.895) (10.336) 
Constant 0.329 -0.439 0.627 -0.625 -0.747 1.733 
 (0.303) (0.522) (2.086) (0.493) (0.540) (1.664) 
Outliers included Yes Yes Yes No No No 
No. obs. 945 945 942 910 910 907 
Pseudo R2  0.477   0.476  
F-test 18.19***  6.10***  18.86*** 4.11*** 
Jarque Bera 854.5***    1266***  
F-test first stage (Pu-
tin)  2.15    3.68** 
F-test first stage (Yel-
tsin)  3.88**    5.68*** 
 
Notes: see tables 1 and 2. For TSLS robust Huber/White standard errors are applied. 
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7. Number of tax audits and tax arrears 
 Previously we have mentioned that the size of tax arrears as proxy for strategic tax collec-
tion has certain disadvantages. In particular, it may be difficult to disentangle the effects of stra-
tegic tax auditing and strategic tax collection on arrears; furthermore, strategic tax auditing might 
as well be of great interest for research. Recently Russian tax authority started reporting an alter-
native indicator, which may be used to complement our study: the number of tax audits per-
formed by the tax collector in a given period. Unfortunately, the results are unavailable for the 
Yeltsin and early Putin period and cannot substitute our previous study; however, we can use the 
new variable to perform a robustness check. Basically, “tax audit” in these statistics means an 
auditing event when the executives of the tax collection office visit the taxpayer’s premises and 
control the accounts and records. Tax audits may be performed by both individuals and legal enti-
ties and are concluded with a statement by the tax collection office confirming the correctness of 
records or indicating violations of the tax law. It goes without saying that the number of tax au-
dits is a very good proxy for tax auditing activity.  
 We have collected the data on the number of tax audits reported by local tax offices in 
Russia for the year 2006. Unfortunately, the data are available only for a subsample including 68 
regions. However, even this approach may yield some interesting results. Table 5 reports the es-
timation results for the year 2006, including various measures of tax collection activity. We use 
the same set of controls as in the previous exercise with the only exception of measures of power 
and democracy (which, as discussed, are obviously outdated for the second term of Putin admini-
stration).  
We obtain the measures of tax collection and auditing by dividing tax arrears and number 
of tax audits by GRP and squaring the result, as in the previous parts of the paper. Obviously, tax 
arrears have a significant and negative impact on the retention rate. The number of audits is posi-
tive, but insignificant. The most interesting part of the exercise, however, is regression (27). We 
simultaneously include the variable of tax collection (tax arrears) and tax auditing (number of tax 
audits) activity in the regression. In this case one can interpret the coefficient of tax arrears as an 
impact of tax arrears on the retention rate conditional on tax auditing effort of the regional gov-
ernment. We still find a negative and significant effect, supporting our conjecture that tax collec-
tion per se has a significant impact on the de-facto fiscal decentralization. Of course, one cannot 
immediately conclude from the estimation for 2006 that the same effect was present in the whole 
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sample; however, this is at least certain evidence in our favor, especially because, as mentioned 
above, the problem of disentangling tax collection and tax auditing is more important for Putin, 
and not for the Yeltsin period. 
 
Table 5: Cross-section regression, 2006, dep. var.: retention rate 
 (24) 
OLS 
(25) 
OLS 
(26) 
OLS 
(27) 
OLS 
 -2.438***  -2.770*** Tax arrears 
squared  (0.700)  (0.821) 
  37.003 49.782 Number of audits 
squared   (36.808) (37.432) 
Tax structure     
-0.021** -0.022*** -0.015* -0.018** Average income 
per capita (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) 
0.093* 0.108** 0.077 0.101* Capital funds 
(0.053) (0.051) (0.058) (0.055) 
Political variables    
Territory 0.032 0.033 0.033 0.036 
 (0.028) (0.027) (0.029) (0.028) 
Population -0.018 -0.023 -0.011 -0.020 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.027) (0.027) 
Oil & gas share -0.864** -0.965*** -0.723* -0.882** 
 (0.345) (0.332) (0.371) (0.359) 
0.018*** 0.020*** 0.018** 0.020*** Distance from 
Moscow (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
0.030 0.035 0.028 0.035 Dummy border 
region (0.037) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) 
0.140 0.131 0.218** 0.205** Dummy republic 
(0.091) (0.092) (0.084) (0.085) 
-0.015 -0.015* -0.014 -0.013 Overrepresentation 
in State Duma (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) 
Fiscal transfers 0.611*** 0.606*** 0.669*** 0.646*** 
 (0.192) (0.191) (0.189) (0.186) 
Share of Russians 0.498** 0.486** 0.686*** 0.681*** 
 (0.207) (0.206) (0.204) (0.203) 
Urbanization 6.174*** 6.183*** 5.030** 5.103** 
 (2.277) (2.3) (2.199) (2.236) 
Constant -0.218 -0.191 -0.386 -0.363 
 (0.300) (0.299) (0.310) (0.312) 
Observations 78 78 67 67 
R2 0.487 0.499 0.528 0.544 
F-test 28.61*** 28.60*** 34.46*** 36.47*** 
Jarque Bera 3.44 3.525 3.230 3.273 
 
Notes: Numbers in parenthesis are robust Huber/White standard errors; *** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 
5% level; * significant at 10% level. Significant results are marked bold. 
 
 Obviously a single cross-section is not sufficient to provide convincing evidence. More-
over, small sample problems preclude solving a variety of potential problems, including 
endogeneity. However, as an additional experiment we estimate all regressions from Table 5 
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ity. However, as an additional experiment we estimate all regressions from Table 5 excluding fis-
cal transfers (which are highly significant and potentially endogenous). The results in terms of tax 
arrears do not change, but also the number of tax audits in regressions (26) and (27) becomes sig-
nificant and positive. On the one hand, the results still support our hypotheses with respect to 
strategic tax collection. On the other hand, in terms of strategic tax auditing, the regional tax au-
thorities seem to act in favor of the regional budget. Once again, it may suggest that the power 
shift in the structure of Russian fiscal federalism was not as decisive, as it may seem: however, 
the issue certainly requires special investigation.  
 
8. Conclusion 
 The aim of this paper is to test whether the strategic manipulations of tax arrears could be 
used in a principal-agent setting with a central government which does not have sufficient infor-
mation and monitoring capacities for a regional influence on tax collection, and regions which are 
able to focus their tax auditing and collection effort on taxes mostly benefiting their budgets. 
Moreover, we have tested, whether federal governments in semi-authoritarian regimes have an 
incentive to manipulate tax collection in their favor. In order to conduct these tests, we analyze 
the case of the Russian Federation.  
 Generally speaking, our results partly confirm the intuition behind this paper: there is evi-
dence that tax arrears are used strategically to manipulate distribution of taxes between the fed-
eral centre and the regions. Our four stage estimation strategy, however, yields heterogeneous 
results. After controlling for potential outliers we show that under Yeltsin the regions seemed to 
have used strategic tax collection to re-allocate the tax revenue in their favor. These results also 
survive the TSLS regressions in order to check for endogeneity and various fixed effects specifi-
cations. On the other hand, annual cross-sections mostly provide evidence in favor of the second 
hypothesis: the federal government was likely to use its power for tax arrears manipulation when 
it became strong. These results, however, seem to be partly driven by a small number of regions 
with extraordinarily high levels of per capita tax arrears.  
 Finally, given the data availability, we provide a short discussion of potential effects of 
tax auditing on fiscal decentralization. According to our estimates from the second term of Putin 
tax arrears have a negative impact on the revenue split even controlling for the tax auditing activ-
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ity; the latter, however, depending upon the specification, has a positive and partially significant 
effect on the retention rates. 
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Appendix A: Data 
Table A1: Descriptive statistics 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Average income per capita 945 3.05 3.27 0.12 29.80 
Capital funds 945 0.30 0.52 0.00 6.46 
Democratization 945 28.59 6.25 14.00 45.00 
Distance from Moscow 945 2.37 2.74 0.00 11.88 
Dummy border region 945 0.43 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Dummy Putin 945 0.58 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Dummy republic 945 0.25 0.43 0.00 1.00 
Dummy Tatarstan and Bashkortostan (Yeltsin) 945 0.01 0.10 0.00 1.00 
Dummy Tatarstan and Bashkortostan (Putin) 945 0.01 0.12 0.00 1.00 
Fiscal transfers 945 0.25 0.19 -0.03 1.11 
Net profit 945 18.29 115.06 -78.59 2797.69
Number of audits per unit of GRP squared 67 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Oil and gas share 945 0.01 0.09 0.00 0.80 
Overrepresentation in the State Duma 945 1.26 1.26 0.22 12.54 
Population 945 1.83 1.54 0.05 10.44 
Power (1995-2000) 945 3.51 3.53 0.00 8.50 
Power (2001-2006) 945 3.49 3.53 0.00 8.50 
Retail trade 942 41.86 119.27 0.10 1817.77
Retention rate 945 0.61 0.14 0.05 1.00 
Share of Russians 945 0.77 0.24 0.01 0.97 
Tax arrears squared 945 0.02 0.20 0.00 4.27 
Tax arrears squared (Putin) 945 0.02 0.20 0.00 4.27 
Tax arrears squared (Yeltsin) 945 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.06 
Territory 945 0.22 0.47 0.00 3.10 
Urbanization 945 0.07 0.01 0.02 0.10 
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Table A2: Description of variables 
Name Description Period Source 
Average income 
per capita 
Average income per capita of the region, 
thousands of RUR16 
1995-2003; 
2006 
Goskomstat17  
Capital funds Value of tangible assets of all enterprises, bln. 
RUR 
1995-2003; 
2006 
Goskomstat  
Democratization Index of democratization of the region, esti-
mated by the experts of the Carnegie Centre 
in Moscow. The higher value of index repre-
sents a higher democratization level 
1995-2003 Carnegie Centre and In-
dependent Institute for 
Social Policy 
Distance from 
Moscow 
Distance between the capital of the region and 
Moscow, thousands of km, 0 for Moscow and 
Moscow oblast, identical for St. Petersburg 
and St. Petersburg oblast 
NA Goskomstat 
Dummy border 
region 
1 if the region has a border to any state out-
side the Russian Federation, 0 otherwise 
NA Own estimation 
Dummy Putin 1 if Putin was president or acting president, 0 
otherwise 
NA Own estimation 
Dummy republic 1 if the region has the status of a republic, 0 
otherwise  
NA Own estimation 
Dummy Tatarstan 
and Bashkortostan 
(Yeltsin) 
1 for Tatarstan or Bashkortostan in 1995-
1999, 0 otherwise 
NA Own estimation 
Dummy Tatarstan 
and Bashkortostan 
(Putin) 
1 for Tatarstan or Bashkortostan in 2000-
2006,  0 otherwise 
NA Own estimation 
Net profit Net profit (profit – loss) of all region’s or-
ganizations, bln. RUR 
1995-2003 Goskomstat 
Number of audits 
squared 
(Number of audits / GRP (in mln. RUR))2 2006 Local branches of the 
State Tax Service 
Oil & gas share (Share of oil extraction in the region in the 
total oil extraction in Russia + Share of the 
gas extraction in the region to the total gas 
extraction in Russia) / 2 
1995-2003, 
2006 
Goskomstat 
Overrepresentation 
in the State Duma 
Share of seats of the region in the State Duma 
(calculated on 225 deputies basis) / Share of 
region in Russian population 
1995-2003, 
2006 
Goskomstat, State Duma, 
own estimation 
Population Population of the region, mln. people 1995-2003, 
2006 
Goskomstat 
Power (1995-
2000) 
Index of power of regional governors, based 
on data like years in office, share on regional 
elections, control of parliament etc. The high-
er value of index represents a higher influence 
of regional governor. The variable is equal to 
this index of power (time-invariant) in 1995-
2000 and zero otherwise 
1995-2000 
(applied for 
all years) 
Jarocinska, 2004 
Power (2001-
2006) 
The variable is equal to the time-invariant 
index of power (calculated in 1995-2000) in 
2001-2006 and zero otherwise 
1995-2000 
(applied for 
all years) 
Jarocinska, 2004 
Retail trade Total retail trade revenue (current prices), bln. 
RUR 
1995-2003 Goskomstat 
                                                          
16  In 1998 the Russian rubl was denominated; therefore all indicators for previous years were divided by 1000. 
17  All Goskomstat (Russian statistical authority) data are provided on the annual basis in the regular publication 
Regions of Russia. 
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Name Description Period Source 
Retention rate 
 
Tax revenue of the consolidated regional 
budget executed / Total tax collection on the 
territory of the region  
1995-2003, 
2006 
Until 1997:  Freinkman, 
Treisman and Titov, 1999 
Since 1998: Ministry of 
Finance and State Treas-
ury (for budget data), 
State Tax Service and 
Goskomstat (for tax col-
lection data) 
Share of fiscal 
transfers 
Fiscal transfers from other governments / To-
tal expenditures of the region’s consolidated 
budget 
1995-2003, 
2006 
Until 1997:  Freinkman, 
Treisman and Titov, 1999 
Since 1998: Ministry of 
Finance and State Treas-
ury18 
Share of Russians  Share of ethnic Russians in the region’s popu-
lation 
2002 
(applied for 
all years) 
Russia’s Census, 2002 
Tax arrears 
squared 
(Total tax arrears / GRP)2 1995-2003, 
2006 
State Tax Service and 
Goskomstat 
Territory Territory of the region, mln. sq.km, 0 for 
Moscow and St. Petersburg 
NA Goskomstat 
Urbanization Share of urban population 1995-2003, 
2006 
Goskomstat 
 
                                                          
18  The budget data are provided by the Institute of Public Finance, Centre for Fiscal Policy (Moscow) databank; by 
the databank Russian Budget supported by the Moscow State University and by the Federal Treasury.  
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Appendix B: Annual cross-sections 
Table B1: Regressions for individual annual cross-sections, 1995-2006, dependent variable: retention rate 
 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
-1.692 0.977 0.897 -0.676 -1.646 -2.031*** -1.209*** -0.180*** -0.279*** -0.043*** -0.034* -1.878** Tax arrears squared 
(5.355) (2.395) (1.788) (1.458) (2.085) (0.696) (0.394) (0.054) (0.055) (0.013) (0.020) (0.868) 
Tax structure    
0.167** 0.075 -0.001 0.044 0.064* 0.015 0.013 -0.008 -0.010 -0.002 -0.018* -0.021*** Average income per 
capita (0.072) (0.048) (0.055) (0.052) (0.038) (0.024) (0.018) (0.015) (0.017) (0.010) (0.011) (0.008) 
-2.075** -0.646** -0.301 -0.655** -0.919*** -0.355 -0.302* -0.011 0.002 -0.077 0.091 0.100* Capital funds 
(0.901) (0.278) (0.399) (0.318) (0.308) (0.237) (0.178) (0.178) (0.128) (0.082) (0.074) (0.056) 
Legal factors 
0.232*** 0.278*** 0.143* 0.284*** 0.361*** 0.266*** 0.055 -0.075 -0.012 -0.114** -0.127 -0.030 Dummy Tatarstan and 
Bashkortostan (0.082) (0.087) (0.072) (0.066) (0.075) (0.093) (0.108) (0.081) (0.058) (0.054) (0.085) (0.110) 
Political variables 
0.084*** 0.035* 0.054** 0.040 0.055** 0.053** 0.040* 0.042* 0.048* 0.071*** 0.050* 0.048** Territory 
(0.027) (0.017) (0.027) (0.027) (0.021) (0.026) (0.022) (0.024) (0.025) (0.023) (0.030) (0.024) 
0.052* 0.026 0.001 0.031 0.059** 0.019 0.033 0.006 0.000 0.020 -0.020 -0.017 Population 
(0.028) (0.022) (0.031) (0.028) (0.026) (0.024) (0.022) (0.027) (0.022) (0.020) (0.029) (0.026) 
0.781** 0.379** 0.211 0.351* 0.396*** 0.316 0.725* -0.087 -0.213 -0.018 -0.827** -0.871** Oil & gas share 
(0.345) (0.156) (0.208) (0.179) (0.139) (0.235) (0.422) (0.556) (0.422) (0.309) (0.361) (0.355) 
0.006 0.018 0.028 0.033 0.020 0.043 0.018 0.028 0.020 0.038 0.025 0.021 Dummy border region 
(0.018) (0.018) (0.022) (0.021) (0.021) (0.028) (0.026) (0.029) (0.029) (0.027) (0.042) (0.037) 
0.009** 0.007* 0.006 0.004 -0.004 0.003 0.010* 0.007 0.012* -0.001 0.015* 0.022*** Distance from Moscow 
(0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.007) 
0.090** 0.068 0.065 0.011 0.066 0.039 0.150 0.138 0.073 0.091 0.038 0.134 Dummy republic 
(0.045) (0.050) (0.053) (0.051) (0.050) (0.090) (0.098) (0.098) (0.066) (0.058) (0.094) (0.091) 
-0.031* 0.001 -0.007 -0.005 0.001 0.005 -0.024 -0.014 -0.013 0.013** 0.022** -0.012 Overrepresentation in 
State Duma (0.017) (0.016) (0.018) (0.019) (0.024) (0.020) (0.014) (0.013) (0.017) (0.006) (0.010) (0.010) 
-0.017 -0.015 -0.019 0.004 -0.014 -0.013 -0.002 -0.001 -0.003 -0.043* -0.049 -0.055* Power 
(0.012) (0.013) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.019) (0.0230) (0.038) (0.031) 
0.192 -0.045 -0.102 -0.035 0.133 0.065 0.202 0.249* 0.269* 0.499** 0.182 0.556*** Fiscal transfers 
(0.163) (0.134) (0.138) (0.101) (0.111) (0.118) (0.124) (0.137) (0.156) (0.199) (0.149) (0.195) 
0.001 0.002 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.000 -0.000 Democratization 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) 
0.170 0.193 0.167 -0.009 0.243* 0.122 0.263 0.258* 0.260** 0.197* 0.113 0.415** Share of Russians 
(0.160) (0.166) (0.145) (0.121) (0.135) (0.180) (0.171) (0.135) (0.108) (0.109) (0.202) (0.192) 
0.237 0.825 1.927 1.853 3.777* 3.200 3.609** 3.260* 2.739 4.753*** 3.519 6.623*** Urbanization 
(0.961) (0.947) (1.594) (2.054) (2.255) (2.250) (1.605) (1.797) (1.882) (1.509) (2.462) (2.160) 
0.476* 0.422* 0.548*** 0.544*** 0.191 0.312 -0.007 0.085 0.199 0.370 0.646** 0.205 Constant 
(0.248) (0.234) (0.203) (0.173) (0.207) (0.238) (0.266) (0.306) (0.285) (0.281) (0.308) (0.350) 
No. obs. 79 79 79 79 79 79 79 79 79 79 77 78 
R2 0.533 0.403 0.335 0.43 0.486 0.367 0.421 0.424 0.508 0.547 0.342 0.531 
F-test 12.51*** 8.40*** 13.42*** 36.89*** 25.51*** 8.57*** 37.56*** 404.10*** 36.22*** 65.95*** 22.73*** 35.21*** 
Jarque Bera 577.3*** 404.5*** 24.22*** 7.066** 9.838*** 14.18*** 81.95*** 46.89*** 7.465** 7.317** 137.5*** 5.291* 
 
Notes: Numbers in parenthesis are robust Huber/White standard errors; *** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level. Signifi-
cant results are marked bold. 
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Table B2: Regressions for individual annual cross-sections after exclusion of outliers (until Jarque Bera test becomes insignificant), 1995-2006, depend-
ent variable: retention rate 
 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
-5.791* -0.492 0.623 1.377** -2.873 -3.178*** -1.443*** -0.233*** -0.308*** -0.031*** -0.024 -1.681** Tax arrears squared 
(3.190) (1.940) (1.490) (0.634) (1.946) (0.560) (0.189) (0.040) (0.051) (0.011) (0.018) (0.742) 
Tax structure 
0.112** 0.034 -0.055 -0.016 0.028 -0.015 -0.008 -0.019 -0.022 0.002 -0.013 -0.019** Average income per capita 
(0.052) (0.034) (0.049) (0.031) (0.027) (0.015) (0.011) (0.012) (0.015) (0.009) (0.008) (0.007) 
-1.296** -0.424** 0.089 -0.012 -0.667*** 0.014 -0.103 0.089 0.091 -0.137* 0.048 0.081 Capital funds 
(0.639) (0.207) (0.341) (0.171) (0.228) (0.136) (0.112) (0.153) (0.112) (0.069) (0.053) (0.052) 
Legal factors 
0.147*** 0.204*** 0.075 0.226*** 0.295*** 0.166*** 0.015 -0.156*** -0.031 -0.114** -0.125 -0.032 Dummy Tatarstan and 
Bashkortostan (0.034) (0.052) (0.054) (0.038) (0.055) (0.059) (0.063) (0.053) (0.059) (0.052) (0.081) (0.108) 
Political variables 
0.066*** 0.030** 0.048** 0.028 0.055*** 0.036** 0.054*** 0.038 0.049** 0.089*** 0.066** 0.056** Territory 
(0.015) (0.013) (0.023) (0.017) (0.020) (0.014) (0.016) (0.025) (0.019) (0.021) (0.025) (0.023) 
0.026 0.008 -0.028 -0.017 0.040** -0.012 0.015 -0.001 -0.012 0.039** -0.004 -0.008 Population 
(0.019) (0.015) (0.027) (0.016) (0.020) (0.014) (0.013) (0.023) (0.021) (0.015) (0.021) (0.023) 
0.500** 0.247** 0.000 -0.001 0.276*** 0.002 0.232 -0.383 -0.518 0.213 -0.621** -0.769** Oil & gas share 
(0.249) (0.109) (0.168) (0.104) (0.103) (0.137) (0.251) (0.479) (0.369) (0.259) (0.263) (0.332) 
0.017 0.025* 0.024 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.033* 0.033 0.037 0.059** 0.046 0.033 Dummy border region 
(0.010) (0.014) (0.020) (0.014) (0.020) (0.017) (0.019) (0.026) (0.026) (0.024) (0.035) (0.034) 
0.009*** 0.006* 0.003 0.005 -0.004 0.003 0.005 0.006 0.013** -0.003 0.011 0.020*** Distance from Moscow 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.007) (0.006) 
0.049* 0.029 0.041 0.029 0.039 0.122** 0.116** 0.211*** 0.083 0.122** 0.061 0.146 Dummy republic 
(0.028) (0.038) (0.045) (0.036) (0.049) (0.048) (0.046) (0.070) (0.067) (0.049) (0.085) (0.088) 
-0.016* 0.011 0.004 0.012* 0.013 0.035*** -0.020** -0.010 -0.008 0.013** 0.022** -0.011 Overrepresentation in State 
Duma (0.009) (0.008) (0.014) (0.007) (0.020) (0.013) (0.010) (0.009) (0.013) (0.006) (0.009) (0.010) 
-0.020** -0.016 -0.011 0.013 -0.013 -0.004 0.011 0.004 -0.004 -0.048** -0.072** -0.068** Power 
(0.009) (0.012) (0.015) (0.013) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.019) (0.018) (0.020) (0.029) (0.029) 
0.039 -0.127 -0.041 0.069 0.091 -0.008 0.233*** 0.133 0.154 0.667*** 0.250* 0.570*** Fiscal transfers 
(0.060) (0.076) (0.111) (0.061) (0.086) (0.075) (0.067) (0.109) (0.127) (0.141) (0.132) (0.191) 
-0.000 0.001 -0.002 0.001 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.006** -0.002 -0.002 -0.000 -0.000 Democratization 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
-0.015 0.026 0.054 0.011 0.116 0.181* 0.149* 0.337*** 0.257** 0.266*** 0.206 0.455** Share of Russians 
(0.053) (0.071) (0.087) (0.059) (0.094) (0.097) (0.082) (0.106) (0.107) (0.089) (0.179) (0.187) 
-0.072 1.110 2.092 -1.357 4.414** 0.686 3.280** 2.453 1.447 5.741*** 3.011 6.312*** Urbanization 
(0.874) (0.740) (1.724) (1.066) (2.163) (1.210) (1.303) (1.543) (1.545) (1.303) (2.417) (2.115) 
0.746*** 0.639*** 0.670*** 0.612*** 0.350** 0.456*** 0.064 0.185 0.355 0.191 0.694** 0.251 Constant 
(0.098) (0.115) (0.168) (0.126) (0.169) (0.152) (0.162) (0.263) (0.243) (0.207) (0.289) (0.336) 
No. obs. 78 78 77 75 78 74 73 77 78 76 76 77 
R2 0.718 0.519 0.363 0.726 0.503 0.601 0.688 0.575 0.548 0.690 0.471 0.578 
F-test 18.76*** 14.05*** 14.94*** 46.32*** 100.14*** 9.80*** 45.98*** 263.11*** 43.36*** 93.73*** 31.63*** 34.49*** 
Jarque Bera 0.385 1.177 0.678 0.535 4.436 0.011 2.264 1.416 0.643 1.076 3.217 0.789 
Outliers Ingushetia Ingushetia Ingushetia 
Kalmyjkia 
Altai Rep. 
Ingushetia 
Kalmykia 
Vologda 
Ingushetia Altai Rep. 
Omsk 
Mordovia 
Ingushetia 
Magadan 
Kabardino-
Balkaria 
Khakassia 
Mordovia 
Ingushetia 
Lipetsk 
Magadan 
Magadan 
Mordovia 
Magadan Lipetsk 
Novgorod 
Briansk 
Voronezh Voronezh 
 
Notes: see table B1 
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Appendix C: Robust regressions and regressions with lagged variables  
 
 Table C1: Robust regressions after exclusion of outliers (until Jarque Bera test becomes insignificant), 1995-
2006, dep. var.: retention rate 
 
 (C1) 
OLS 
(C2) 
OLS 
(C3) 
OLS 
(C4) 
OLS 
(C5) 
OLS 
(C6) 
OLS 
(C7) 
OLS 
(C8) 
OLS 
(C9) 
OLS 
(C10) 
OLS 
-0.035*** -0.033*** -0.555 -0.194 -0.064*** -0.117 0.049** -0.726 0.033*** -0.080 Tax arrears 
squared (Putin) (0.007) (0.007) (0.608) (0.452) (0.005) (0.343) (0.025) (0.520) (0.012) (0.297) 
2.575*** 1.719*** 2.566*** 1.662*** 1.121** 1.338*** 3.772*** 3.719*** 0.975** 1.185* Tax arrears 
squared (Yeltsin) (0.426) (0.433) (0.433) (0.427) (0.494) (0.499) (0.630) (0.661) (0.452) (0.611) 
 -0.069***  -0.067***       Dummy Putin 
 (0.011)  (0.011)       
Tax structure           
0.021*** 0.022*** 0.020*** 0.021*** -0.001 0.002 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.001 0.001 Average income 
per capita (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
-0.086*** -0.088*** -0.079*** -0.083*** -0.044** -0.041** -0.089*** -0.085*** -0.080*** -0.085*** Capital funds 
(0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.018) (0.020) (0.018) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018) 
Legal factors           
 
-0.065* -0.061* -0.070** -0.062* -0.132*** -0.130***     
Dummy Tatarstan 
and Bashkortostan 
(Putin) (0.035) (0.037) (0.035) (0.037) (0.035) (0.036)     
 
0.170*** 0.171*** 0.168*** 0.174*** 0.146*** 0.153***     
Dummy Tatarstan 
and Bashkortostan 
(Yeltsin) (0.028) (0.026) (0.029) (0.027) (0.024) (0.025)     
Political variables          
0.024** 0.025** 0.015 0.015 0.031*** 0.025***     Territory 
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.007) (0.007)     
-0.005 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.000 -0.002 0.081** 0.067** 0.107*** 0.105*** Population 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.032) (0.031) (0.025) (0.026) 
-0.018 -0.011 -0.009 -0.001 -0.035 -0.046 2.865 1.955 5.255 5.756 Oil & gas share 
(0.047) (0.045) (0.049) (0.047) (0.046) (0.052) (4.750) (4.711) (3.727) (3.870) 
0.023*** 0.024*** 0.017** 0.016* 0.020*** 0.016**     Dummy border 
region (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007)     
0.005*** 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.006***     Distance from 
Moscow (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)     
0.079*** 0.082*** 0.102*** 0.100*** 0.096*** 0.105***     Dummy republic 
(0.022) (0.022) (0.021) (0.021) (0.016) (0.016)     
-0.007 -0.007 0.004 0.003 0.008** 0.010*** 0.003 0.005 0.006 0.005 Overrepresentation 
in State Duma (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.007) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) 
-0.028*** -0.024*** -0.018** -0.015** -0.022*** -0.017**     Power (2001-
2006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)     
-0.018** -0.021*** -0.009 -0.012* -0.006 -0.002     Power (1995-
2000) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006)     
0.053 0.072** 0.060* 0.076** 0.080*** 0.083*** -0.182*** -0.231*** -0.021 -0.047 Fiscal transfers 
(0.036) (0.035) (0.035) (0.034) (0.028) (0.029) (0.041) (0.042) (0.027) (0.028) 
-0.002* -0.002* -0.001 -0.001 -0.002** -0.001 -0.006*** -0.006** 0.000 0.001 Democratization 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
0.138*** 0.145*** 0.190*** 0.190*** 0.152*** 0.177***     Share of Russians 
(0.042) (0.042) (0.039) (0.038) (0.030) (0.029)     
0.266 0.365 -1.079** -1.044** 0.636 -0.280 3.173 5.642 1.469 4.206 Urbanization 
(0.570) (0.547) (0.510) (0.491) (0.429) (0.396) (3.558) (3.463) (2.469) (2.66) 
0.615*** 0.633*** 0.580*** 0.605*** 0.700*** 0.665*** 0.501* 0.344 0.335* -0.702*** Constant 
(0.074) (0.071) (0.070) (0.068) (0.075) (0.075) (0.261) (0.252) (0.189) (0.204) 
Region fixed 
effects 
No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time fixed effects No No No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Kalmykia, Altai 
Rep. and In-
gushetia included 
Yes Yes No No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Observations 899 895 884 884 875 866 924 901 879 870 
R2 0.363 0.394 0.392 0.413 0.610 0.613     
F-test 27.87*** 29.61*** 24.70*** 25.38*** 45.34*** 37.91*** 13.55*** 13.58*** 34.84*** 69.64*** 
Jarque Bera 4.442 4.275 1.463 3.965 4.548 1.044 4.294 3.276 2.083 4.447 
Notes: see tables 1 and 2. Outliers include:  
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Table C2: Robust regressions after exclusion of political variables, 1995-2006, dep. var.: retention rate 
 
 (C11) 
OLS 
(C12) 
OLS 
(C13) 
OLS 
(C14) 
OLS 
(C15) 
OLS 
(C16) 
OLS 
(C17) 
OLS 
(C18) 
OLS 
(C19) 
OLS 
(C20) 
OLS 
-0.084** -0.074** -0.086*** 0.039 0.027 -0.439 0.019 0.193 -0.474 0.206 Tax arrears 
squared (Putin) (0.038) (0.036) (0.033) (0.030) (0.023) (0.661) (0.511) (0.318) (0.512) (0.249) 
2.266** 0.217 0.162 4.305*** 2.266** 3.175*** 1.270*** 1.286** 4.783*** 2.795*** Tax arrears 
squared (Yeltsin) (1.028) (1.123) (1.264) (0.786) (0.904) (0.522) (0.487) (0.587) (0.783) (0.933) 
 -0.074***     -0.067***    Dummy Putin 
 (0.017)     (0.015)    
Tax structure           
0.010*** 0.016*** 0.007 0.009*** 0.004 0.009*** 0.014*** 0.006 0.009*** 0.006 Average income 
per capita (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.002) (0.004) 
-0.084*** -0.095*** -0.079*** -0.056*** -0.044** -0.089*** -0.098*** -0.083*** -0.055*** -0.046** Capital funds 
(0.015) (0.017) (0.016) (0.020) (0.022) (0.015) (0.017) (0.016) (0.020) (0.022) 
Legal factors           
 
-0.058 -0.039 -0.044   -0.060* -0.043 -0.049   
Dummy Tatarstan 
and Bashkortostan 
(Putin) (0.036) (0.039) (0.047)   (0.035) (0.038) (0.045)   
 
0.169*** 0.167*** 0.163***   0.147*** 0.147*** 0.143***   
Dummy Tatarstan 
and Bashkortostan 
(Yeltsin) (0.024) (0.021) (0.023)   (0.024) (0.020) (0.022)   
0.601*** 0.635*** 0.639*** 0.201*** 0.542*** 0.611*** 0.641*** 0.646*** 0.532*** 0.528*** Constant 
(0.009) (0.010) (0.022) (0.051) (0.044) (0.008) (0.006) (0.023) (0.050) (0.042) 
Region fixed ef-
fects 
No No No Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes 
Time fixed effects No No Yes No Yes No No Yes No Yes 
Kalmykia, Altai 
Rep. and In-
gushetia included 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No No 
Observations 945 945 945 945 945 910 910 910 910 910 
R2 0.108 0.143 0.230   0.137 0.419 0.265   
F-test 20.59*** 25.23*** 19.81*** 13.09*** 17.10*** 22.59*** 25.76*** 22.05*** 10.57*** 17.19*** 
 
Notes: see tables 1 and 2 
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Table C3: Lagged regressions, 1996-2006, dep. var.: retention rate of the period t+1 
 
 (C21) 
OLS 
(C22) 
OLS 
(C23) 
OLS 
(C24) 
OLS 
(C25) 
OLS 
(C26) 
OLS 
(C27) 
OLS 
(C28) 
OLS 
(C29) 
OLS 
(C30) 
OLS 
-0.021 -0.016 -0.031 0.078*** 0.057*** -1.280 -0.660 -0.442 -1.312* -0.300 Tax arrears 
squared (Putin) (0.031) (0.029) (0.026) (0.025) (0.017) (0.927) (0.620) (0.427) (0.754) (0.348) 
0.182 -1.500 -0.525 1.492** 1.238 1.104* -0.364 0.874 1.515** 1.588* Tax arrears 
squared (Yeltsin) (1.032) (1.070) (1.173) (0.746) (0.862) (0.594) (0.617) (0.626) (0.764) (0.936) 
 -0.125***     -0.109***    Dummy Putin 
 (0.017)     (0.015)    
Tax structure           
0.007 0.011** -0.006 0.014*** -0.007 0.006 0.010* -0.003 0.013*** -0.003 Average income 
per capita (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.007) 
-0.062** -0.071*** -0.034 -0.093*** -0.073*** -0.041 -0.049* -0.018 -0.075*** -0.063** Capital funds 
(0.026) (0.026) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.027) (0.028) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) 
Legal factors           
 
0.257*** 0.269*** 0.244***   0.215*** 0.227*** 0.204***   
Dummy Tatarstan 
and Bashkortostan 
(Yeltsin) (0.036) (0.036) (0.035)   (0.034) (0.032) (0.032)   
 
-0.060* -0.035 -0.040   -0.080** -0.058 -0.056   
Dummy Tatarstan 
and Bashkortostan 
(Putin) (0.035) (0.041) (0.048)   (0.033) (0.038) (0.045)   
Political variables          
0.037*** 0.037*** 0.046***   0.021* 0.020* 0.029***   Territory 
(0.013) (0.012) (0.010)   (0.012) (0.011) (0.009)   
-0.004 -0.005 -0.003 0.091** 0.141*** -0.007 -0.007 -0.006 0.047 0.097** Population 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.039) (0.050) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.035) (0.043) 
-0.060 -0.045 -0.076 4.743 7.732 -0.083 -0.071 -0.100 2.326 5.323 Oil & gas share 
(0.078) (0.072) (0.066) (5.814) (6.020) (0.083) (0.079) (0.069) (5.662) (5.819) 
0.029** 0.027** 0.028***   0.015 0.014 0.015   Dummy border 
region (0.012) (0.012) (0.011)   (0.011) (0.011) (0.010)   
0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007***   0.009*** 0.008*** 0.008***   Distance from 
Moscow (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)   (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)   
0.072** 0.068** 0.077***   0.079*** 0.076*** 0.083***   Dummy republic 
(0.031) (0.031) (0.029)   (0.029) (0.029) (0.027)   
-0.009 -0.011 -0.003 -0.018 -0.008 -0.001 -0.003 0.002 -0.012 -0.005 Overrepresentation 
in State Duma (0.009) (0.009) (0.007) (0.019) (0.014) (0.009) (0.009) (0.007) (0.015) (0.013) 
-0.024** -0.017* -0.036***   -0.016 -0.010 -0.032**   Power (2001-
2006) (0.010) (0.009) (0.014)   (0.010) (0.009) (0.014)   
-0.025** -0.029*** -0.012   -0.017* -0.020** -0.001   Power (1995-
2000) (0.010) (0.009) (0.008)   (0.010) (0.009) (0.007)   
0.116** 0.147*** 0.169*** -0.027 0.074 0.077* 0.106** 0.134*** -0.168*** -0.054 Fiscal transfers 
(0.056) (0.055) (0.055) (0.066) (0.059) (0.043) (0.041) (0.041) (0.044) (0.039) 
-0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.006** -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.005** -0.000 Democratization 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
0.180*** 0.181*** 0.191***   0.165*** 0.166*** 0.177***   Share of Russians 
(0.065) (0.064) (0.059)   (0.052) (0.051) (0.045)   
2.371*** 2.398*** 3.100*** 3.792 0.415 0.189 0.215 0.702 8.015* 3.053 Urbanization 
(0.779) (0.754) (0.770) (4.739) (4.574) (0.674) (0.646) (0.625) (4.595) (4.585) 
0.448*** 0.490*** 0.550*** 0.509 0.284 0.561*** 0.595*** 0.674*** 0.242 0.207 Constant 
(0.112) (0.107) (0.131) (0.575) (0.329) (0.091) (0.088) (0.112) (0.351) (0.332) 
Region fixed ef-
fects 
No No No Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes 
Time fixed effects No No Yes No Yes No No Yes No Yes 
Kalmykia, Altai 
Rep. and In-
gushetia included 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No No 
Observations 867 867 867 867 867 834 834 834 834 834 
R2 0.188 0.209 0.292   0.216 0.231 0.311   
F-test 15.13*** 17.45*** 19.92*** 36.11*** 20.67*** 14.21*** 19.18*** 25.05*** 10.65*** 19.95*** 
Notes: see tables 1 and 2 
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Appendix D: Separate estimations for Yeltsin and Putin periods 
 
Table D1: Panel data regressions for Yeltsin period, 1995-1999, dep. var.: retention rate 
 
 (D1) 
OLS 
(D2) 
OLS 
(D3) 
OLS 
(D4) 
OLS 
(D5) 
OLS 
(D6) 
OLS 
(D7) 
OLS 
(D8) 
OLS 
0.282 -0.156 0.628 -0.615 1.362*** 1.131** 2.488*** 1.113** Tax arrears 
squared (Yeltsin) (1.082) (1.260) (0.844) (0.795) (0.403) (0.529) (0.511) (0.531) 
Tax structure 
-0.030*** 0.021 -0.066*** 0.003 -0.040*** 0.006 -0.058*** 0.006 Average income 
per capita (0.011) (0.017) (0.014) (0.018) (0.010) (0.011) (0.013) (0.015) 
-0.027 -0.276*** 0.155** -0.076 0.073 -0.110* 0.091** -0.124* Capital funds 
(0.069) (0.096) (0.060) (0.087) (0.052) (0.063) (0.045) (0.068) 
Legal factors 
0.218*** 0.247***   0.145*** 0.176***   Dummy Tatarstan 
and Bashkortostan (0.044) (0.045)   (0.024) (0.026)   
Political variables 
0.057*** 0.052***   0.038*** 0.034***   Territory 
(0.014) (0.015)   (0.011) (0.012)   
-0.014** -0.001 -0.118 -0.254 -0.019*** -0.011** 0.248 0.004 Population 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.275) (0.252) (0.005) (0.004) (0.232) (0.212) 
0.039 0.135** -1.074 -4.588 -0.015 0.048 -1.821 -5.300* Oil & gas share 
(0.048) (0.057) (3.889) (3.695) (0.032) (0.036) (3.752) (2.955) 
0.023** 0.023**   0.014* 0.015**   Dummy border 
region (0.012) (0.011)   (0.008) (0.007)   
0.006** 0.006**   0.006*** 0.005***   Distance from 
Moscow (0.003) (0.003)   (0.002) (0.002)   
0.068** 0.058**   0.057*** 0.048***   Dummy republic 
(0.031) (0.029)   (0.020) (0.018)   
0.001 -0.004 0.007 0.011 0.014*** 0.009* 0.007 0.014 Overrepresentation 
in State Duma (0.010) (0.011) (0.041) (0.034) (0.005) (0.005) (0.035) (0.029) 
-0.015* -0.015*   -0.006 -0.006   Power 
(0.008) (0.008)   (0.007) (0.007)   
0.054 0.039 0.085 0.059 0.012 0.011 -0.031 -0.042 Fiscal transfers 
(0.080) (0.080) (0.065) (0.057) (0.034) (0.033) (0.040) (0.035) 
-0.000 -0.000 -0.018 -0.003 -0.000 -0.000 -0.015 -0.003 Democratization 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.011) (0.010) (0.001) (0.001) (0.010) (0.008) 
0.160* 0.148   0.064* 0.059*   Share of Russians 
(0.094) (0.091)   (0.035) (0.032)   
2.425** 1.774* -7.467 -7.455 -0.082 -0.722 5.804 4.036 Urbanization 
(0.963) (1.010) (7.731) (6.550) (0.51) (0.487) (5.300) (4.987) 
Constant 0.437*** 0.409*** 2.812*** 3.446 0.640*** 0.605*** 0.588 0.355 
 (0.137) (0.135) (0.689) (2.515) (0.067) (0.063) (2.120) (1.947) 
Region FE No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Time FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Outliers included Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No 
No. obs. 395 395 395 395 380 380 380 380 
R2 0.304 0.372   0.486 0.566   
F-test 19.52*** 14.72*** 54.67*** 19.30*** 23.83*** 28.35*** 108.13*** 17.78*** 
Note: see tables 1 and 2 
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Table D2: Median regressions for Yeltsin period, 1995-1999, dep. var.: retention rate 
 
 (D9) 
Median 
(D10) 
Median 
(D11) 
Median 
(D12) 
Median 
(D13) 
Median 
(D14) 
Median 
(D15) 
Median 
(D16) 
Median 
1.175** 0.763 1.688* 0.458 1.400*** 1.262* 2.160** 1.928* Tax arrears 
squared (Yeltsin) (0.522) (0.828) (0.865) (1.029) (0.523) (0.764) (0.893) (0.986) 
Tax structure 
-0.041*** -0.002 -0.052*** -0.008 -0.044*** -0.001 -0.052*** 0.009 Average income 
per capita (0.012) (0.017) (0.015) (0.025) (0.012) (0.017) (0.015) (0.025) 
0.092 -0.080 0.109 -0.001 0.111* -0.050 0.100 -0.087 Capital funds 
(0.058) (0.097) (0.071) (0.104) (0.060) (0.091) (0.066) (0.109) 
Legal factors 
0.162*** 0.189***   0.157*** 0.166***   Dummy Tatarstan 
and Bashkortostan (0.037) (0.041)   (0.035) (0.039)   
Political variables 
0.030** 0.022   0.025* 0.015   Territory 
(0.015) (0.015)   (0.013) (0.012)   
-0.022*** -0.013** 0.118 -0.140 -0.022*** -0.014** 0.175 -0.027 Population 
(0.005) (0.006) (0.312) (0.326) (0.005) (0.006) (0.294) (0.313) 
-0.013 0.059 0.996 -2.674 -0.007 0.039 0.68 -4.193 Oil & gas share 
(0.093) (0.159) (7.687) (6.791) (0.094) (0.197) (7.760) (6.786) 
0.020** 0.018**   0.014* 0.012   Dummy border 
region (0.008) (0.009)   (0.007) (0.008)   
0.007*** 0.006***   0.007*** 0.006***   Distance from 
Moscow (0.002) (0.002)   (0.002) (0.002)   
0.044* 0.050**   0.046* 0.037   Dummy republic 
(0.024) (0.022)   (0.025) (0.023)   
0.010 0.011 -0.056 -0.018 0.016** 0.012 -0.041 -0.021 Overrepresentation 
in State Duma (0.008) (0.008) (0.066) (0.058) (0.007) (0.007) (0.066) (0.056) 
-0.008 -0.003   -0.007 -0.000   Power 
(0.007) (0.007)   (0.007) (0.007)   
0.004 -0.007 0.086 0.044 0.010 0.005 0.036 0.005 Fiscal transfers 
(0.053) (0.049) (0.064) (0.060) (0.046) (0.046) (0.067) (0.053) 
-0.001 -0.001 -0.013 0.003 -0.001 -0.000 -0.013 0.003 Democratization 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.022) (0.020) (0.001) (0.001) (0.03) (0.026) 
0.069 0.097**   0.046 0.049   Share of Russians 
(0.056) (0.049)   (0.046) (0.043)   
0.873 0.317 1.800 -2.002 0.084 -0.744 1.507 2.186 Urbanization 
(0.549) (0.601) (10.738) (9.549) (0.508) (0.587) (10.944) (10.316) 
Constant 0.604*** 0.531*** 1.300 0.977 0.653*** 0.593*** -0.712 0.374 
 (0.096) (0.078) (1.026) (0.933) (0.080) (0.075) (3.023) (3.187) 
Region FE No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Time FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Outliers included Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No 
No. obs. 395 395 395 395 380 380 380 380 
Pseudo R2 0.219 0.259 0.523 0.571 0.287 0.337 0.507 0.563 
Note: see tables 1 and 2 
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Table D3: Panel data regressions for Putin period, 2000-2006, dep. var.: retention rate 
 
 (D17) 
OLS 
(D18) 
OLS 
(D19) 
OLS 
(D20) 
OLS 
(D21) 
OLS 
(D22) 
OLS 
(D23) 
OLS 
(D24) 
OLS 
-0.041 -0.056** 0.085*** 0.052*** 0.063 -0.041 0.711* 0.596 Tax arrears 
squared (Putin) (0.030) (0.023) (0.017) (0.013) (0.361) (0.317) (0.417) (0.365) 
Tax structure 
0.017*** -0.009* 0.023*** -0.011 0.015*** -0.008 0.021*** -0.007 Average income 
per capita (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.007) 
-0.080*** -0.030 -0.075** -0.046 -0.059** -0.019 -0.062* -0.041 Capital funds 
(0.027) (0.030) (0.035) (0.034) (0.027) (0.031) (0.034) (0.033) 
Legal factors 
-0.011 -0.038   -0.017 -0.038   Dummy Tatarstan 
and Bashkortostan (0.054) (0.060)   (0.053) (0.059)   
Political variables 
0.020 0.045***   0.007 0.031***   Territory 
(0.013) (0.010)   (0.013) (0.010)   
0.002 0.009 0.028 0.120*** -0.001 0.006 0.013 0.096** Population 
(0.008) (0.007) (0.039) (0.045) (0.007) (0.007) (0.040) (0.040) 
-0.045 -0.096 2.064 5.411 -0.084 -0.120 0.505 3.899 Oil & gas share 
(0.102) (0.132) (8.268) (8.678) (0.113) (0.137) (8.140) (8.513) 
0.035** 0.036**   0.018 0.022   Dummy border 
region (0.016) (0.015)   (0.015) (0.015)   
0.005 0.008**   0.008** 0.009***   Distance from 
Moscow (0.004) (0.003)   (0.003) (0.003)   
0.095** 0.110***   0.113*** 0.121***   Dummy republic 
(0.042) (0.038)   (0.041) (0.038)   
-0.018* -0.002 -0.016 -0.003 -0.012 0.001 -0.018 -0.006 Overrepresentation 
in State Duma (0.010) (0.007) (0.016) (0.010) (0.010) (0.007) (0.015) (0.010) 
0.229*** 0.270*** -0.202* -0.031 0.187*** 0.247*** -0.339*** -0.142 Fiscal transfers 
(0.063) (0.065) (0.112) (0.111) (0.059) (0.063) (0.094) (0.106) 
-0.002 -0.002 0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.009* 0.001 Democratization 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.009) (0.012) (0.002) (0.001) (0.005) (0.011) 
0.277*** 0.275***   0.291*** 0.284***   Share of Russians 
(0.077) (0.067)   (0.070) (0.064)   
1.749* 4.017*** -0.172 -6.228 -0.194 2.150** -0.896 -5.940 Urbanization 
(0.940) (0.923) (4.424) (4.358) (0.856) (0.877) (4.407) (4.266) 
Constant 0.178 0.194* 0.680** 0.851** 0.285*** 0.278*** 1.221*** 0.822** 
 (0.114) (0.111) (0.305) (0.396) (0.103) (0.106) (0.178) (0.385) 
Region FE No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Time FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Outliers included Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No 
No. obs. 550 550 550 550 530 530 530 530 
R2 0.244 0.409   0.235 0.389   
F-test 16.42*** 17.08*** 15.36*** 29.91*** 12.37*** 18.33*** 16.42*** 28.96*** 
Note: see tables 1 and 2 
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Table D4: Median regressions for Putin period, 2000-2006, dep. var.: retention rate 
 
 (D25) 
Median 
(D26) 
Median 
(D27) 
Median 
(D28) 
Median 
(D29) 
Median 
(D30) 
Median 
(D31) 
Median 
(D32) 
Median 
-0.035 -0.061 0.062 0.040 0.289 -0.171 0.275 0.428 Tax arrears 
squared (Putin) (0.227) (0.221) (0.105) (0.141) (0.827) (0.515) (0.592) (0.801) 
Tax structure 
0.026*** -0.006 0.027*** -0.012* 0.025*** -0.003 0.026*** -0.006 Average income 
per capita (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.007) 
-0.119*** -0.074* -0.060 -0.012 -0.112*** -0.061 -0.056 -0.025 Capital funds 
(0.025) (0.043) (0.045) (0.053) (0.028) (0.044) (0.045) (0.051) 
Legal factors 
-0.072 -0.111**   -0.083 -0.101*   Dummy Tatarstan 
and Bashkortostan (0.050) (0.055)   (0.057) (0.054)   
Political variables 
0.009 0.050***   -0.005 0.045***   Territory 
(0.020) (0.011)   (0.020) (0.011)   
0.010 0.019** -0.001 0.063 0.007 0.015** 0.001 0.058 Population 
(0.007) (0.008) (0.103) (0.074) (0.007) (0.007) (0.107) (0.077) 
0.067 0.044 -5.481 7.257 0.055 -0.021 -3.777 10.72 Oil & gas share 
(0.274) (0.233) (15.24) (16.246) (0.296) (0.339) (14.845) (16.976) 
0.028* 0.025**   0.017 0.021*   Dummy border 
region (0.015) (0.012)   (0.015) (0.011)   
0.003 0.004   0.004 0.004   Distance from 
Moscow (0.003) (0.003)   (0.003) (0.003)   
0.122*** 0.132***   0.129*** 0.129***   Dummy republic 
(0.043) (0.025)   (0.043) (0.023)   
-0.015 0.009 -0.001 0.003 -0.014 0.010 -0.003 0.002 Overrepresentation 
in State Duma (0.013) (0.011) (0.023) (0.017) (0.013) (0.008) (0.021) (0.016) 
0.127* 0.196*** -0.307*** -0.073 0.084 0.195*** -0.376*** -0.088 Fiscal transfers 
(0.068) (0.050) (0.078) (0.068) (0.066) (0.051) (0.076) (0.077) 
-0.004*** -0.003*** -0.013 0.009 -0.003** -0.003** -0.016** -0.014 Democratization 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.011) (0.009) (0.001) (0.001) (0.007) (0.012) 
0.300*** 0.243***   0.283*** 0.255***   Share of Russians 
(0.076) (0.046)   (0.075) (0.042)   
-0.137 2.453*** 4.763 -2.357 -1.038 1.497** 5.220 -3.354 Urbanization 
(0.845) (0.753) (5.462) (4.916) (0.820) (0.638) (5.706) (4.818) 
Constant 0.327*** 0.377*** 0.897*** 0.779*** 0.409*** 0.402*** 0.989*** 1.386*** 
 (0.111) (0.088) (0.309) (0.243) (0.113) (0.081) (0.217) (0.264) 
Region FE No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Time FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Outliers included Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No 
No. obs. 550 550 550 550 530 530 530 530 
Pseudo R2 0.186 0.311 0.504 0.572 0.199 0.323 0.506 0.565 
Note: see tables 1 and 2 
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Appendix E: Russian tax system 
• The tax system comprises federal, regional and local taxes. The most important taxes (profit tax, VAT, personal 
income tax, excises on alcohol, tobacco etc., rental payments for natural resources, and single social tax, which 
replaced the contributions to public health, pension and unemployment insurance and was imposed on wages 
and paid by employers19) are federal taxes. These taxes should be imposed in all regions of the Russian Federa-
tion. However, the revenue from several of these taxes (profit tax, personal income tax, several excises, pay-
ments for natural resources, and, until Putin’s tax reform, VAT) are divided between different levels of govern-
ment; the share of the federal centre can even become equal to zero – but the tax is still legally a federal one, be-
cause it is set by the federal centre. The tax rates for the federal taxes are set by the federal government with on-
ly one exception: for the profit tax the federal government does not set the tax rate, but the maximal tax rate, and 
the regions can reduce it by several percentage points. Moreover, until 2000 regions had the right to grant ex-
emptions from their portions of federal taxes, and there were some presidential decrees establishing special tax 
regime for individual regions (like Ingushetia in 1994 or Karelia in 1992-1994). These options were used in two 
ways. Many regions implemented specific tax regimes for individual business groups with strong ties to the re-
gional government (Yankovsky, 2001); the impact of these regimes is, however, quantitatively completely opa-
que (it would require the knowledge of individual tax bases for hundreds of enterprises). Few regions used the 
opportunity to lower federal tax rates at a larger scope, and became “internal tax heavens”.  
• The division of tax revenue from the federal taxes was originally set in federal acts on individual taxes, which 
were consequently replaced by chapters of the Tax Code. For several taxes (VAT, income tax) the division was 
changed in annual budget acts (the so-called “regulating taxes”), which were passed by the federal parliament. 
However, the proportions are identical for all regions of Russia, with the only exception of Tatarstan and Bash-
kortostan. The distribution of tax revenue and tax rates was quite volatile: for example, for the personal income 
tax the regions received 100% in 1994; 90% in 1995-1996, once again 100% in 1997-1999, 84% in 2000, 99% 
in 2001 and 100% in 2003 and 2004. The tax rate moved from a progression system to the flat tax of 13%. For 
the VAT the regions received 25% until the first quarter of 1999, 15% from the second quarter of 1999 to 2000, 
and 0% afterwards; the overall tax rate was lowered from 28% in the early 1990s (before the start of our sample) 
to 20%, and once again to 18% in 2004. For the corporate profit tax the federal government until the first quar-
ter of 1999 applied a tax rate of 13%, from the second quarter of 1999 to 2001 of 11%, from 2002 to 2004 7.5%, 
and from 2004 6%. The overall tax rate for the corporate profit tax was 35% until 2002 and 24% afterwards, so 
the difference was attributed to the regions. However, regions had the right to manipulate only part of “their” tax 
rate: from 2001 on they could reduce it only by 5 percent points.  
• Regional and local taxes are set by the regions (which still may only “choose” from the predetermined list of the 
federal government), which may also choose the tax rate (within the range set by the federal government). This 
group includes, however, mostly property taxes (land tax, personal and corporate real estate taxes). The specif-
ics of the Russian economy make these taxes unimportant (in fact, for the personal real estate tax the costs of 
administration systematically exceed its tax revenue). First, the structure of property rights for real estate and 
land is very vague and provides for many options for tax avoidance. Second, the valuation of many objects is far 
below their market value and based on outdated norms, partly inherited from the Soviet past. The tax rates are 
small: those of the real estate tax for individuals varied from 0.1 to 2% (depending on the value of the real estate 
object) and for organizations it changed over time from 2% to 2.2% (maximum rate determined by the federal 
government). Most regions used the maximum tax rate,20 but granted countless exceptions. Another regional tax 
used from 1999 to 2003 was the sales tax of 5%, which was, however, introduced by practically all regions and 
did not form any source of regional heterogeneity. 
• Finally, the royalties for natural resources formed an important base for regional tax revenue until Putin’s tax 
reform 2001. During this period the regional consolidated budget received 60% for extraction of hydrocarbon 
raw materials and 75% for other minerals. After the tax reform under Putin the taxation of natural resources was 
redistributed towards the federal center. 
                                                          
19  We list only the main taxes, although the Russian fiscal system included a variety of minor taxes. The overall 
description of the tax system is rather stylized than exact; nevertheless, it is hardly possible to provide a detailed 
overview of the turbulent changes in the Russian taxation for nearly a decade.  
20  In fact, in an environment of strategic tax collection this behavior is no surprise: it is reasonable to set its „own“ 
tax rate to the maximum and try to manipulate the tax collection effort for the taxes mostly attributed to the other 
level of government.  
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